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Forensic researchers and practitioners continue to face challenges when attempting to 
differentiate deceptive response styles, notably when comparing malingering and factitious 
disorder. However, due to the great disparities in research available, forensic examiners may not 
be adequately informed for considering factitious presentations as a competing hypothesis to 
malingering. De-emphasis of factitious disorders may also be attributed to the lack of empirical 
research and poor conceptual understanding of the disorder. Velsor and Rogers conducted a 
thorough review of various factitious motivations, drawing a parallel to Rogers’ explanatory 
models of malingering. Due to the need for a systematic measure of FPPs, the Inventory of Self 
and Interpersonal Problems (I-SIP) was developed, largely based on the explanatory models of 
FPP. The current study employed a construct validity approach to the I-SIP to examine its 
convergent and discriminant validity in a sample of 80 inpatients from a private psychiatric 
hospital. Providing strong evidence of construct validity of the I-SIP, dramatic differences 
emerged between malingered and factitious presentations with extremely large effect sizes (ds = 
1.09 – 3.62). In particular, results indicated strong support for the nurturance explanatory model 
of FPPs, as over-investment in treatment providers was an especially strong discriminator (d = 
3.62). Moreover, results highlighted the potential problem of misclassification of response styles, 
as the SIMS did not effectively distinguish between simulation groups. To avoid diagnostic 
issues, arguments are presented for the consideration of FPPs as a dimensional construct that 
vary over time and circumstances. Professional implications are discussed, including practical 
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Factitious diagnoses involve the conscious falsification of either psychological or 
physical symptoms and are classified as a form of intentional deception (APA, 2013). The 
dissimulation occurs in the absence of obvious external gains with the reasons being primarily 
internal, such as the reward and attention of being a patient and “playing the sick role” (APA 
(APA), 2013; Yates, Mulla, Hamilton, & Feldman, 2018). More generally, both physical and 
psychological dissimulation have been extensively studied and appear in many well-documented 
cases studies throughout the last century. These cases provide evidence that certain patients 
intentionally falsify or exaggerate their symptoms experienced in effort for internal gains 
(Feldman & Cunnien, 2008).  
Such cases of deliberate feigning are generally categorized into factitious disorders and 
malingering. In contrast to factitious disorders, malingering is characterized by individuals who 
falsify and exaggerate symptoms for external gains or reasons, such as unwarranted financial 
gain or more lenient legal sentencing in criminal cases (Yates et al., 2018). Thus, the core of 
what differentiates malingering from factitious disorders involves the primary motivation driving 
the dissimulation.  
According to Merten and Rogers (2017), forensic practitioners often emphasize 
malingering to the possible exclusion of factitious disorders. It is argued that the likely presence 
of a malingering bias in forensic contexts is due to the prevalence of cases in which individuals 
may possess strong incentives to fabricate or exaggerate symptoms in the context of the justice 
system (Ford, 2010; Merten & Rogers, 2017). Conversely, it is argued that a factitious bias is 
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present (i.e., internal motivations or adoption of sick role) for patients in more clinical, 
treatment-based settings. The apparent scarcity of factitious presentations in forensic contexts 
compared with malingering likely contributes to these assumptions (Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, 
Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998; Young, 2015). In addition, DSM-5’s explicit consideration of 
antisocial personality disorder (APD) is especially salient in the context of criminal forensic 
referrals. This consideration plays an important role in the emphasis of malingered response 
styles in forensic contexts. 
Factitious disorders hold particular importance for forensic practitioners in classifying 
dissimulation. When feigning is suspected, forensic psychologists may often be faced with rival 
hypotheses of whether the feigning encompasses external motivations (i.e., malingering) or the 
absence of obvious external rewards (i.e., factitious disorders; APA, 2013). Specialty guidelines 
inform forensic psychologists to take a balanced and unbiased approach to assessment, expecting 
that they “weigh all data, opinions, and rival hypotheses impartially.” (APA, 2013, p. 9). 
However, due to the great disparities in research available, forensic examiners may not be 
adequately informed for considering factitious disorders as a competing hypothesis to 
malingering. De-emphasis of factitious disorders may also be attributed to the lack of empirical 
research and poor conceptual understanding of the disorder (Cunnien, 1997). 
A resulting fundamental concern involves the potential misclassification of feigning 
presentations as malingering, when rival hypotheses were not seriously considered (Rogers, 
Jackson, & Kaminski, 2005). An increased recognition of factitious presentations may lead to 
greater understanding of the underlying motives of patients. Forensic practitioners want to be 
accurate in classifying examinees, particularly in high stakes contexts (e.g., prison sentencing). 
Vastly different outcomes might possibly occur for examinees determined to be malingering as 
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compared to factitious disorders. For example, plaintiffs feigning to gain monetary compensation 
might be viewed more punitively in the judicial system than those who are exaggerating 
symptoms because of emotional or dependent needs.  
As noted, very little research has been conducted on factitious disorders despite strong 
clinical interests. Feldman and Cunnien (2008) believed the poverty of research stemmed from 
the difficulty in objectively measuring factitious motivations. In contrast, cases of malingering 
appear to have clearer motives for external gain (e.g., lesser criminal sentences or monetary 
compensation). Given the lack of objective measures, current factitious literature understandably 
consists of mostly case studies. In particular, these case reports have formed the basis thus far for 
the development of detection strategies for factitious disorder (Feldman & Cunnien, 2008; Yates 
et al. 2018). The current study aims to address the lack of standardized measurement for 
factitious response styles.  
This chapter is organized into five broad sections. To provide a thorough overview, the 
first section covers the historical development of factitious disorders. Next, the second section 
examines the evolution of factitious disorders as a diagnostic category; it centers on specific 
changes to DSM criteria through subsequent editions. The third section compares feigned 
presentations, most notably malingering and factitious disorders. It further discusses the forensic 
implications. The fourth section provides a parallel discussion of explanatory models for 
malingering and factitious disorders. This section outlines the methodology that is used in the 
current study. Lastly, the fifth section introduces the current study and its hypotheses.  
Origins of Factitious Disorder 
The first usage of the term “factitious disorder” has been attributed to Hector Gavin 
(1838), who references the Cyclopedia of Practical Medicine (Forbes, Tweedie, & Conolly, 
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1833) as his original source for the term. Gavin used the term “factitious” to differentiate types 
of feigning in his book on military malingering for cases in which clinical evidence was 
fabricated or distorted. The term was used sporadically throughout the next century. 
Interestingly, most cases of factitious disorder have historically been heavily weighted toward 
medical conceptualizations of the disorder and involved “a collection of exotic medical and 
surgical syndromes” (O’Shea, 2003, p. 33). However, modern conceptualization of factitious 
disorder was not recognized until Richard Asher’s (1951) seminal paper describing his clinical 
experiences with patients with factitious disorders (Kanaan & Wessely, 2010).  
Asher’s establishment of Munchausen’s syndrome sparked the widespread recognition of 
factitious disorder as we know it today. Asher (1951) applied the term “Munchausen’s 
syndrome” to describe patients that had numerous hospitalizations, surgeries, and those that lives 
generally revolved around their feigned medical illness. These patients were typically admitted 
to hospitals after serious physical complaints of stomach, blood, or neurologic issues, although 
medical tests failed to corroborate the patients’ subjective complaints (Feldman & Cunnien, 
2008). Regarding medical management, typical patients with factitious disorder were described 
as uncooperative, often had prior admissions using different aliases, and regularly discharged 
themselves hastily against medical recommendations. Scholars now believe Asher’s 
conceptualization of Munchausen’s syndrome to be a rare, and likely untreatable form of 
factitious disorder (Feldman, 2004).  
Following Asher’s (1951) paper, the reports on the diagnosis of factitious disorders 
skyrocketed, rising from 2 cases in 1961 to 131 cases in 2001 (Kanaan & Wessely, 2010). Since 
the recognition of Munchausen’s and related factitious disorders, reports have been documented 
from nearly every medical specialty of patients’ feigning symptoms; they now account for about 
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5% of all physician encounters (Kanaan & Wessely, 2010).  
The existence of a diagnostic void was recognized, as clinicians were faced with feigned 
presentations that did not neatly fit into already established diagnostic categories, most notably, 
hysteria and malingering. Hysteria, malingering, and factitious disorder are similar in that they 
are falsified presentations of sickness (Spence, 2001). In hysteria, patients truly believe they are 
ill and are in need of medical or psychological attention. In cases of malingering, the patient is 
pretending to be ill for some sort of external gain and is typically viewed as a criminal act. But 
the mechanisms behind and consequences of factitious disorders are much more ambiguous and 
demand clearer understanding.  
Patients with hysteria, factitious disorders, and malingering may have similar clinical 
presentations, and thus, practicing clinicians must decide on their interpretations of motives in 
reaching a diagnostic conclusion. Because of the similar clinical presentations, determinations 
cannot be made on the basis of symptoms or associated features alone (Feldman & Eisendrath, 
1996). Kanaan and Wessely (2010) suggest if the patient does not possess awareness about their 
falsified presentation, then hysteria may be the appropriate diagnosis. An additional 
consideration involves the locus of motivation for dissimulation (i.e., internal vs. external). Thus, 
determining the patient’s motivation and self-awareness in reaching a diagnosis relies entirely on 
clinicians’ judgment (Spence, 2001). The growing problem of diagnostic difficulty and 
ambiguity of factitious disorders deserves more scholarly attention.  
Diagnostic Etiology and Categorization 
DSM-III 
Due to diagnostic issues, DSM-III (APA, 1980) created an entirely new category to 
account for factitious disorders, which encompassed presentations of intentionally produced 
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physical or psychological symptoms (Caselli, Poloni, Ielmini, Diurni, & Callegari, 2017; Hyler 
& Spitzer, 1978). Its intended purpose was to “fill the large middle ground between hysterical 
disorder and malingering” (Hyler & Spitzer, 1978, p. 1502). It was recognized that not all forms 
of feigning might be dichotomized as either (a) motivations for external incentives or (b) patients 
that truly thought they were ill. Therefore, not all patients were neatly categorized as malingering 
or hysteria. Factitious disorders were created to account for feigning motivated by internal 
incentives with no apparent goal other than to assume the role of the patient (Hyler & Spitzer, 
1978; Turner, 1999).   
Factitious disorders were first differentiated from hysteria by levels of conscious 
motivation; hysteria symptoms are produced unconsciously whereas factitious symptoms are 
created consciously (Hyler & Spitzer, 1978). Second, factitious disorders were distinguished 
from malingering by motivation of external versus internal gains. Diagnostic criteria indicated 
factitious disorders involve internal motives, such as psychological needs, rather than external 
gains associated with malingering, such as the desire to avoid punishment (Kanaan & Wessely, 
2010).  
In DSM-III (APA, 1980), the criteria for factitious disorders were described as the 
“intentional production or feigning of physical or psychological signs or symptoms” (Criterion 
A), that are “motivated by a desire to assume the sick role” (Criterion C). As an exclusion 
criterion, symptoms produced are “not being better explained by any other mental disorder” 
(Criterion B; APA, 1980, p. 287). Upon its initial classification, four subtypes of factitious 
disorder must be considered: (a) predominantly physical signs and symptoms, (b) predominantly 




DSM-III-R and DSM-IV 
DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) inclusion criteria for factitious disorder largely remained the 
same. However, a single exclusion criterion was added: factitious disorder “must not occur 
exclusively under the course of another Axis I disorder, such as schizophrenia” (APA, 1987, p. 
319). The rationalization for this exclusion criterion was not articulated and is difficult to 
comprehend. It appears to suggest that patients with other chronic mental disorders (e.g., severe 
depression or intellectual impairment) should not be diagnosed with factitious disorders. 
However, the rationale for this exclusion appears questionable, because individuals plausibly 
could engage in factitious presentations, separate from their serious mental disorders (Velsor & 
Rogers, 2019). For example, an individual with chronically severe depression may also 
factitiously present a medical syndrome.  
DSM-IV’s (APA, 1994) changes to factitious disorders diagnostic criteria involved minor 
adjustments. The internal production of feigning and the motivation to assume the sick role 
stayed the same, but an additional criterion was added that stated, “external incentives (such as 
economic gain) must be absent” (APA, 1994, p. 474). This modification presumably represents 
an attempt to differentiate the external gain core feature of malingering from factitious disorder. 
Inexplicably, the explicit criterion requiring, “not explained by any other mental disorder” (APA, 
1980, p. 287) was removed from DSM-IV. In the subsequent DSM-IV text revision (DSM-IV-TR; 
APA, 2000), the criteria and language remained identical. 
DSM-5 
DSM-5 represented sweeping changes to the diagnostic classification of factitious 
disorders. Until then, factitious disorder was placed in its own diagnostic category. In DSM-5, it 
was subsumed in the category of Somatic Symptom and Related Disorders. This important 
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change presumably resulted from the shift in research and literature to focus on factitious 
disorders with somatic symptomology that are predominantly seen in medical settings. In line 
with DSM-5’s (APA, 2013) effort to reduce the number of diagnoses, the subtypes (physical and 
psychological) were also removed.  
Factitious disorder by proxy is now modified from a provisional research status, as it was 
in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), to a full DSM-5 diagnosis. The subcategories consist of ‘factitious 
disorder imposed on the self’ (FDIOS) and ‘factitious disorder imposed on another’ (FDIOA; 
APA, 2013, p. 324). FDIOS entails falsification of physical or psychological symptoms or the 
induction of injury or disease on oneself. In contrast, FDIOA includes the same criteria but 
involves another person (i.e., the victim) as impaired, injured, or ill.  
A major shift in DSM-5 involved its specification regarding external motivation. Once a 
core requirement for diagnosis of factitious disorder, the inclusion criterion, the desire to play the 
sick role of a patient (for oneself or through another) has been removed in DSM-5 criteria (APA, 
2013). This adjustment in classification was aimed at shifting focus away from understanding the 
underlying motivations in favor of more objective measures, such as identifying false symptoms 
(Yates et al., 2018).  This change also appears to be consistent with ICD-10, with the goal of 
capturing diagnoses with greater specificity (Andrews, Slade, & Peters, 1999). It could be argued 
that identifying intentionally produced physical symptoms, such as ingesting harmful substances 
for the purpose of appearing ill, should be more easily detected than one’s underlying 
motivation. With the focus on factitious disorder in medical settings, the goal of identifying 
falsified symptoms objectively follows this logic. However, this shift may also de-emphasize the 




DSM-5’s four criteria for factitious disorder (APA, 2013, p. 324) are as reproduced: 
(A) The falsification of physical or psychological signs or symptoms, or induction of 
injury or disease, associated with identified deception. 
(B) The individual presents himself/herself or another individual to others as ill, 
impaired, or injured.  
(C) The deceptive behavior is evident even in the absence of obvious external rewards.  
(D) The behavior is not better explained by another mental disorder, such as delusional 
disorder or another psychotic disorder. 
In summary, factitious disorders as a diagnostic category evolved throughout DSM 
editions, though DSM-5 represents the most extensive changes. The modifications in DSM-5 
reflect great conceptual shifts to diagnostic classification. Shifts to move away from considering 
underlying motivation in effort to increase objectivity largely ignores the complexity of factitious 
disorders and introduces substantial diagnostic issues.  
Diagnostic Issues 
The intentionality of feigning and underlying motivation of factitious disorder 
differentiates it diagnostically from other disorders that present in a similar fashion, like somatic 
symptom disorder (Ford, 2010; Kanaan & Wessely, 2010). In somatic symptom and related 
disorders, like functional somatic syndromes (e.g., chronic fatigue), medically unexplained 
symptoms are putatively produced unconsciously (Feldman, 1996). In factitious disorders, the 
deceptive illness is considered to be an outcome of an intentional desire to satisfy certain internal 
goals (Yates & Feldman, 2016). Internal incentives may include the desire for extra medical 
attention and nurturance. Sharma and Manjula (2013) indicated that both somatic symptom 
disorder and factitious disorder share the commonalities of social dysfunction, increased usage of 
healthcare services, and high levels of dissatisfaction for both patients and treating clinicians.  
Voluntary control or intentional feigning is a well-established and accepted component of 
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factitious disorders, but the diagnostic standards leave something to be desired. Nearly two 
decades ago, Overholser (1990) provided explicit criteria regarding the voluntarily control of 
symptoms. He stated the following as criteria: (a) admission of deceit by the patient, (b) presence 
of physiologically impossible symptoms, (c) observable evidence, which is contradicted by 
objective testing, (d) physical evidence, and (e) non-stereotypical response to treatment. 
However, “intention” and “voluntariness” do not necessarily explain one’s motivation for 
deception, and thus, do not provide clarity for diagnostic standards. Eisendreth (1994) analogized 
factitious disorders to phobias, indicating that persons may act intentionally but may lack 
awareness of latent psychological motivations. In other words, individuals may possess an 
appreciation of their feigned behavior — much like individuals with phobia recognize their 
specific fears. However, they do not acquire a full understanding as to why they are engaging in 
pathological behavior, whether that be strict avoidance in phobia or feigned symptoms in 
factitious disorder (Eisendreth, 1994).  
DSM-5 does not contain specifiers for severity levels of factitious disorder, which 
appears inconsistent with the overall DSM-5 approach. Much earlier, Eisendrath (1994) 
suggested that the level of enactment of factitious behavior could provide insight into the 
severity level. For him, circumscribed production of factitious symptoms or complaints 
constitutes the lowest level of enactment, whereas the simulation of disease or extreme medical 
or psychological issues typically comports with most severe level of enactment.  
The formal diagnoses of factitious disorder only occur when patients are either detected 
or admit to feigning (Guzman & Correll, 2008). Because it is difficult to discern motivation and 
the absence of clear external incentives, clinicians must rely on circumstantial evidence to first 
develop conjecture and then confirm evidence of feigning (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014).  This 
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approach poses major challenges to clinicians, as patients with factitious disorder might put in 
substantial effort to keep their feigning behavior from becoming detected. Additionally, accusing 
an individual of feigning a mental or physical illness represents a strong allegation that clinicians 
are likely hesitant to make unless there is certainty. Taken together, the diagnostic 
conceptualization of factitious disorder lacks clear criteria, which poses a diagnostic problem for 
practitioners.  
Physical Factitious Disorders 
As noted earlier, physical factitious disorders are studied more frequently than their 
psychological factitious counterparts, likely because medical symptoms (e.g., ingested 
substances) may be more easily detected. Patients with physical-factitious disorder typically 
appear in physician’s offices, emergency departments, or other medical specialty departments 
(Yates et al., 2018). The American Psychological Association (APA, 2013) defines medical 
falsification in three general ways. First, physical-factitious presentations may consist of 
exaggerated symptoms and unequivocal lies about current or past symptoms and history (APA, 
2013; Yates & Feldman, 2016). Second, it may involve the production of compelling signs or 
symptoms by (a) manipulations to prolong or exacerbate an existing illness, or (b) actual self-
induction of disease (APA, 2013). A third approach to medical falsification may involve 
ingesting harmful substances or mutilating the skin to appear ill (Yates et al. 2018). Most 
commonly, patients with physical-factitious presentations combine the three general approaches 
(Ferrara et al., 2013).  
Physical-factitious disorder cases have been documented across a variety of medical 
settings. According to Fliege et al. (2007), the majority of factitious cases seen in dermatology 
settings involve patients presenting with rashes, burns, infections, or non-healing injuries. 
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Neurological or endocrinology settings, with factitious complaints commonly involve seizures or 
thyroid dysregulation (Ashawesh, Murthy, & Fiad 2010; Bauer, 1996). Additionally, medical 
patients with physical-factitious disorder may present in general practices with complaints of 
emergent concerns, such as coughing up blood (Kokturk et al., 2006).  
The literature on physical-factitious disorders clearly illustrates nearly any medical issue 
can be feigned. Moreover, individuals have access to medical information readily available on 
the Internet. They are able to order pharmaceutical drugs online, and have access to other 
methods that allow them to deceptively present their illness as genuine (Ferrara et al., 2013). 
Because factitious disorders require compelling evidence, the medical cases most frequently 
discovered to be factitious involve self-induction of illness or simulation of symptoms (Yates et 
al., 2018). As noted, this stringent requirement of corroborative proof for deception severely 
reduces the number to only provable cases. Thus, it creates the perspective that physical-
factitious disorder is limited to only rare cases, when in reality, they likely occur more frequently 
than reported.   
Psychological Factitious Disorders 
As previously discussed, factitious psychological disorders are difficult to study 
empirically due to the complexity and diversity of clinical presentations (Feldman, 2004). 
Evidence of falsification becomes even more challenging due to the lack of physiological data. 
Despite this challenge, Carney and Brown (1983) estimated that psychological presentations of 
factitious disorder comprise around 40% of the factitious disorder imposed on self cases 
(FDIOS). According to Popli, Masand, and Dewan (1992), underestimates are likely due to the 
complexities in the diagnostic considerations.  The exclusive diagnosis of factitious disorder is 
considered rare because of extensive comorbidity with mental disorders (e.g., personality 
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disorders, mood disorders, and chemical dependency) (Cunnien, 1997; Feldman, Ford, & 
Reinhold, 1994). 
In summary, the conceptual nature of psychological-factitious disorder is poorly 
understood even though researchers have identified several key facets of the disorder. These 
conceptual facets will be discussed later in the section on explanatory models of factitious 
psychological presentations. 
Comparison of Malingering and Factitious Disorders 
As possibly a false dichotomy, the source of primary motivation continues to be the 
decisive factor for differentiating factitious disorder and malingering.  If external gains are 
present, then the patient’s diagnosis of factitious disorder is excluded and the classification of 
malingering is proposed (Cunnien, 1997; Ford, 2010; Overholser, 1990). Compellingly, Cunnien 
(1997) argued that this dichotomy contradicts the clinical knowledge of multifaceted levels of 
behavior. He contended that the presence of external gain should not, by itself, disqualify an 
individual for the diagnosis of factitious disorder. As he indicated, a patient could be engaging in 
deceptive behavior and exaggerating pain for both external gains (e.g., obtaining narcotics for 
chemical dependency) and internal gains (e.g., avoiding heated conflicts with a spouse).  
The assumption that the inclusion or exclusion of incentives alone can be used 
diagnostically overlooks day-to-day reality. Incentives free of liabilities do not occur when 
individuals are feigning in regard to their or others’ health. As Vitacco (2018) indicated, parents 
presenting with FDIOA risk facing significant criminal charges if detected, in addition to 
possible harm to their children. A more balanced approach would consider both incentives and 
disincentives for feigning behavior. When making a decision, persons must consider (a) the 
purpose of the decision, (b) those who could potentially be affected, and (c) examine alternative 
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options (Satay, 2008). McGraw, Larsen, Kahneman, and Schkade (2010) suggested that 
decision-making processes involve examining potential risk when comparing possible 
advantages or disadvantages.  
In summary, the conceptual nature of malingering and factitious disorder are similar. 
Thus, the line of distinction between internal and external motive is blurred (Turner, 1999; 
Velsor & Rogers, 2019). Building on their similarities and differences, explanatory models are 
presented in the next section.  
Explanatory Models of Malingering 
Rogers (1990a) developed an explanatory model of malingering to examine potential 
motivations behind malingering both conceptually and empirically. It is important to distinguish 
the definition of malingering from explanatory models of malingering. DSM-5 defines 
malingering as the “intentional production of false of grossly exaggerated physical or 
psychological problems” (APA, 2013, p. 726). The definition is widely accepted, but significant 
criticism persists about the ways in which the DSM classifies malingering because of its lack of a 
clear explanation regarding motivation (Rogers, 1990b).  
   The classification of malingering appears to be largely based on one explanatory model, 
even though not formally incorporated into DSM’s definition. As an overview, the explanatory 
models are: pathogenic, adaptational, and criminological. The explanatory models involve goals 
for developing a greater understanding of the complex motivations to malinger. From an 
empirical perspective, subsequent research by Rogers, Sewell, and Goldstein (1994) and Rogers, 
Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, and Leonard (1998) on the explanatory models utilized prototypical 
analyses. A combined sample of 521 highly experienced forensic experts rated prototypical 
attributes associated with the three explanatory models of malingering listed above.   
 
15 
The pathogenic model of malingering posited that feigning represented individuals’ 
ineffectual attempts to control underlying psychopathology by consciously reproducing 
symptoms of mental disorders (Rogers 1990a, 1990b). This model predicts that a progressive 
loss of control gives way to genuine symptoms. The pathogenic model also posits that 
individuals feel trapped by their psychopathology and compelled to feign mental disorders 
(Rogers 1990a).  
Pathogenic explanations appear to be the least convincing model for malingering, with a 
central theme involving an underlying genuine disorder. It explained the motivation for 
malingering as an early or prodromal sign of a severe mental disorder (Rogers et al., 1994). The 
pathogenic model — compared to the other explanatory models — had the lowest prototypical 
ratings among forensic experts (Rogers et al., 1994). For instance, experts gave a mean rating of 
1.76 (on a Likert scale from: 1 = unimportant to malingering to 7 = very important to 
malingering) for pathogenic explanations. Contrary to the pathogenic model prediction, 
malingerers have not traditionally shown the deterioration of feigned into genuine symptoms. 
Rogers et al.’s (1998) prototypical ratings comparing forensic and non-forensic populations 
generally confirmed the relative unimportance of the pathogenic model to explanations of 
malingering. Additionally, economic motivations, which are common in cases of malingering, 
remain inconsistent with the pathogenic model (Rogers et al., 1994; 1998).  
The criminological model of malingering explains motivations in terms of antisocial 
attributes of an individual (Rogers, 1990a). Criminological explanations align closely with the 
DSM approach, which indicates malingering should be strongly suspected if a person has 
antisocial personality disorder (Berry & Nelson, 2010). Considering this alignment with the DSM 
approach, the criminological model emphasizes a general assumption of “badness,” such as bad 
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circumstances (e.g., jails or prisons) and acting uncooperative when evaluated (Rogers & 
Bender, 2018). The criminological model has fairly high prototypical ratings from forensic 
experts, providing convincing evidence that the motivation to malinger is often antisocially 
based (Rogers et al., 1994). The two highest prototypical items consist of, (a) not exhibiting 
responsibility for the problems they cause others (M = 5.11) and (b) a lack of guilt for feigning 
psychological problems (M = 4.50).  
Most recently, the adaptational model explains motivations for malingering in terms of a 
constructive attempt to avoid adversarial consequences (Rogers, 1990a). Thus, malingerers 
perceive their circumstances to be both adversarial and risky. They may view malingering as 
their most favorable or least adversarial option (Rogers, 1990b). Rogers and colleagues (1994) 
found prototypical analyses of facets associated with the adaptational model received high 
prototypical ratings. Highly rated prototypical items included, (a) motivation to malinger based 
on an attempt to cope with very difficult circumstances (M = 4.88) and (b) weighing their 
alternatives before deciding to feign (M = 4.11) (Rogers et al., 1994). Overall, many forensic 
experts agree that an adaptive motivation to malinger is a compelling explanation.  
Explanatory Models of Factitious Psychological Presentations 
This central section applies explanatory models to factitious-psychological presentations. 
As an important distinction, the current paper focuses on factitious psychological presentations 
(FPPs) rather than factitious disorder for three primary reasons. First, DSM-5 eliminated the 
subtype diagnoses of psychological factitious disorder and physical factitious disorder at both 
diagnostic and specifier levels. Second, it is uncertain if factitious disorders should have ever 
qualified as a formal diagnosis. On this point, Rogers, Bagby and Rector (1989) questioned the 
legitimacy of factitious disorder as a diagnosis due to the absence of clearly defined inclusion, 
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exclusion, or outcome criteria. Third, dissumulation based soley on the presence of external 
rewards provided a questionable demarcation between a DSM diagnosis (factitious disorder) or a 
V code (malingering). Based on these reasons, Velsor and Rogers (2019) concluded that FPP 
should be considered a dimensional construct rather than a categorical diagnosis.  
The explanatory models of malingering continue to be valuable in delineating the 
underlying motivation for feigning. Thus, as a beginning point, these models are investigated for 
FPPs.  
In an earlier review, Rogers (2004) extrapolated from the explanatory models of 
malingering to factitious disorders. At that time, most studies emphasized pathogenic 
motivations with psychodynamic driven theories (e.g, disrupted family relations and sexualized 
speculations). As a result, behavioral models accounting for symptom production or potential 
secondary gain were largely ignored in favor of pathogenic explanations. Much more recently, 
Velsor and Rogers (2019) represented the first systematic effort to examine motivations for FPPs 
via explanatory models without an almost exclusive focus on psychodynamically-based theories.  
The following sections detail the findings in the literature on factitious disorder and 
discusses the literature in terms of components of explanatory models of FPPs. Table 1 
summarizes the key findings for four FPP explanatory models (. 
Pathogenic Model  
Similar to malingering, the FPP pathogenic model posits an underlying genuine disorder 
and a tension between an unawareness of the underlying illness and deliberate feigning of a 
mental disorder (Rogers, 1990a; 1990b). Various conceptual components of factitious disorder 
appear to fit into this explanation as a major motivation to feign. This section begins with a 
review of the underlying disorders in FPPs. It continues with an examination of affective 
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elements of FPP motivation. The final component addresses behavioral aspects, such as addictive 
and demanding behaviors of FPPs from the perspective of the pathogenic model.  
Pathogenic explanations of FPPs central component involve the presence of an 
underlying genuine disorder. Yates et al. (2018) found that factitious symptoms often emerge 
after psychologically meaningful conflicts, either occupationally or interpersonally, and these 
patients often exaggerate real, pre-existing symptoms. The resulting fabrication of symptoms can 
in turn allow the patient to ignore the psychological consequences of real ongoing stressors in 
their life. Playing the sick role may allow individuals to engulf themselves in fantasy life and 
escape their real stressors and psychopathology. As an alternative to serving the purpose of 
engaging further in the sick role of the patient, it is possible individuals with FPP lack insight 
into their experienced symptoms (Yates et al., 2018).  
Lawlor and Kirakowski (2014) found that those with factitious disorder felt like their 
genuine disorder felt more validated if they intentionally exaggerated its severity. Because their 
genuine disorders were not being acknowledged sufficiently, exaggerating symptoms made them 
feel more supported and legitimized. Yates and colleagues (2018) indicate that a considerable 
proportion of FPP presentations appear context-driven, briefly developing as a result of 
underlying psychopathology and stress. Similarly, Lawlor and Kirakowski’s (2014) notion of 
feeling dismissed or discounted may provide the context for motivation to amplify symptoms.  
Parker’s (1996) findings provide additional support to pathogenic explanations of an 
underlying genuine disorder in FPPs. He indicated that when factitious patients submit to 
psychological testing, traits of psychopathic deviance, hysteria, paranoia, hypochondriasis, and 
depression may be documented. When individuals express more somatic and affective 
symptoms, it is likely that their focus on symptoms intensifies the salience of their distress level. 
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This proposition contrasts with the notion of FPP functioning as an alleviation of stressors (Yates 
et al., 2018). Feeling as if genuine disorders are invalidated or feigning emerging from 
psychopathy to alleviate stress could contribute to maintaining FPPs, but the underlying 
motivations differ.  
Negative affective states also appear to be central to pathogenic explanations of FPPs. 
Feldman (2004) discussed the element of helplessness and contributes potential insight into how 
FPP behavior is preserved over time. He concluded that FPP behaviors were maintained by 
individuals feeling helpless and trapped in their patient role. Some patients with FPP may 
acknowledge and recognize the maladjusted nature of their behavior, but may not be able to 
establish alternative options and thus, feel cornered (Feldman, 2004).  
Lawlor and Kirakowski (2014) built on the component of feeling trapped and helpless 
and extended it to severe fear. The researchers conclude that FPP behavior may be maintained 
because of patients’ fear of disclosing their feigning behavior to loved ones or healthcare 
professionals. Patients may fear (a) loss of support and trust if they disclose and may also, (b) 
lose a familiar coping method. The driving force with severe fear appears to be negative 
reinforcement (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014). Factitious patients may be fearful of facing their 
true underlying problems if they cease feigning behavior, which supports the pathogenic 
explanation that there is an underlying genuine disorder.  
In addition to FPPs being maintained by negative affective states, findings indicate strong 
behavioral components. Lawlor and Kirakowski’s (2014) discussion of the addictive element of 
FPP suggests a rewarding component, whereas Feldman’s (2004) concept of helplessness shows 
a more negative side of how FPPs are preserved. Lawlor and Kirakowski (2014) discovered that 
many individuals with factitious disorder acknowledged issues with deterrence and restraint from 
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exaggerating or fabricating symptoms, but nonetheless, still felt addicted to feigning. Based on 
Orford’s (2001) excessive appetite model, as behaviors become more rewarding, they become 
increasingly addictive. Thus, persons with FPPs gain more emotional rewards, such as increased 
attention and care, the feigning behavior becomes more addictive, and a cycle is produced. Some 
persons felt their FPP behavior was uncontrollable, and thus, their needs to continue their FPP 
were stronger than their needs to stop (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014).  
With the pathogenic model, Yates et al. (2018) discussed a demanding element to 
factitious disorder, as patients tend to have inordinate comfort in playing the role of a patient. 
The demanding element of factitious presentations could possibly result from an underlying 
genuine disorder, a major premise of the pathogenic explanatory model. Alternatively, it may be 
considered an emotional expression of FPP as expressed in their demanding of treatment and 
care. Moreover, Yates and colleagues (2018) indicate factitious patients tended to present with 
an aggressive demandingness of treatment if they do not get the care they believe is deserved.  
A self-destructive component to the nature of factitious disorders in line with the 
overarching demanding element appears to fit into the pathogenic explanation. Blatant self-harm 
is often involved in cases of factitious presentations, but this is primarily recognized in physical 
cases (e.g., ingesting substances to have the appearance of being ill) (Hamilton, Feldman, & 
Janata, 2009). Even though some factitious patients realize the self-destructive nature of their 
feigning behavior, they still experience feelings of being trapped and view this as a way to 
demand treatment (Feldman, 2004).  
In summary, pathogenic explanations of FPPs involve an underlying genuine disorder 
that may manifest as (a) as response to alleviate stressors (Yates et al., 2018) (b) genuine 
disorders feeling invalidated (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014). Parker (1996) indicated that FPPs 
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may emerge when psychological traits and disorders are present, such as depression or 
hypochondriasis. According to pathogenic explanations, FPPs may be maintained by negative 
affective components, such as severe fear (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014) and helplessness 
(Feldman, 2004). In addition, FPPs consist of behavioral aspects and may be maintained by 
rewarding elements, such as addictiveness (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014), as well as a 
demandingness of treatment (Yates et al., 2018).  
Criminological Model 
The criminological model explains feigning behavior in terms of antisocial and non-
conforming, oppositional attributes of an individual (Rogers, 1990a; Rogers et al., 1994). As an 
important distinction, FPP is not considered when the motivation is predominated by undeserved 
rewards achieved at the expense of others. Examples include (a) misusing hospitals or mental 
health treatment centers, and (b) inflating medical expenses via unnecessary treatment, such as 
investigations and interventions, or hospital admission. It is common for the healthcare costs of a 
single patient with factitious disorder to exceed $200,000 because of a long history of 
unwarranted treatment or services (Yates & Feldman, 2016).  
In keeping with the criminological model, deceptive behavior for FPPs adversely impacts 
healthcare providers and insurance companies by their depletion of valuable resources (Feldman, 
2004). The treatment staff deceived by factitious patients may experience considerable 
psychological distress (Yates et al., 2018). They may experience feelings of anger and likely feel 
“cheated” if it is discovered that patients’ behaviors are factitious in nature (Yates & Feldman, 
2016).  
Criminological explanations of FPPs also involve an interpersonal component involving 
antisocial behavior, such as the facet of pathological lying or pseudologia fantastica (Feldman, 
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2004; Yates et al., 2018). On this point, Feldman (2004) suggests pathological lying to be a 
common trait in those with factitious presentations. As evidence of deception, the symptom 
presentation of patients with FPPs tends to be more pronounced when treatment providers are 
present. A remarkable discrepancy is noted between behavior and symptoms reported versus 
observed (Yates et al., 2018). With behaviors viewed as antisocial, patients with factitious 
presentations may not have empathy or regard for those taking care of them and the negative 
impact this might have.  
Ford (2010) suggested an element of enjoyment or gratification for those who engage in 
factitious behavior. He hypothesized that some presenting with factitious disorders might be 
motivated a “duping delight,” a term associated with deception and generating worry or a sense 
of emergency in others. However, Lawlor and Kirakowski (2014) found only 9% of persons with 
factitious disorders were motivated by the pleasure of misleading others.  
In summary, criminological explanations are less salient to factitious presentations than 
malingering, where antisocial motivations are often central. However, criminological 
motivations for FPP should not be entirely discounted. FPPs may be emerge from an antisocial 
background and be maintained by the desire to control and manipulate others (Yates & Feldman, 
2016). Interpersonal facets of pathological lying (Feldman, 2004; Yates et al., 2018) and possibly 
“duping delight” (Ford, 2010) may also be central. 
Adaptational Model 
The adaptational model suggests that feigning is rooted in motivational desires to succeed 
in highly adversarial consequences (Rogers, 1990a; 1990b). Persons are understandably 
motivated to achieve the least detrimental outcome. This explanatory model of deception 
conceptualizes FPPs from a risk-benefit context. A convincing explanation for malingering 
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(Rogers et al., 1994), it may also apply to conceptual elements of FPPs.  
FPPs may serve both situational and adaptive functions in adversarial contexts. Without 
any more favorable options, factitious behavior can begin to meet persons’ psychological needs, 
although it is may possibly exacerbate dependency needs in the long term (Feldman, 2004). 
Within the adaptational model, dependency is emphasized as a “trade-off” in the context of few 
viable options. Experiencing challenging events in life can cause factitious behavior to manifest, 
and exaggerating or fabricating symptoms can allow them to feel like they have control (Lawlor 
& Kirakowski, 2014). In treatment settings, individuals may become dependent on engaging in 
factitious behavior as a coping mechanism, which may allow them to receive attention and 
nurturance, thus reinforcing the FPP.   
Expanding on the risk-benefit analysis of the adaptational model, strategic denial appears 
to be an important component of factitious presentations. Obviously, forthright admissions to 
exaggerating symptoms can carry highly aversive consequences, including anger or disapproval 
by deceived health care providers. In the long term, such admissions also introduce the 
possibility of the denial of future treatment for even genuine conditions (Yates & Feldman, 
2016). Individuals with FPPs have a tendency to admit themselves to hospitals and have strong 
reactions of denial and discharge quickly if confronted about the legitimacy of their illness 
(Parker, 1996). If confronted, the patients may have reactions of denial of feigning and 
disengagement in treatment (Feldman, 2004). These patients may view admitting the truth as 
risky, and engage in defensive behavior as an adaptive method to avoid detection and protect 
one’s credibility (Yates & Feldman, 2016). According to the adaptational model, FPP patients 




The exaggeration or fabrication of FPP symptoms appears to be context dependent, 
giving support to the strategic denial component. Individuals may present with atypical 
presentations or unusual patient behavior, and these symptoms may intensify under the 
supervision of healthcare professionals to give the appearance of extreme need of care (Yates & 
Feldman, 2016). As noted, FPP symptom presentations suddenly appear more prominent in the 
presence of treatment providers (Yates & Feldman, 2016). This dissimulation is likely an 
adaptive mechanism, as factitious patients are trying to succeed in convincing others of the 
legitimacy of their illness. 
The adaptational model in treatment settings addresses perceived needs, not the gradual 
improvement found with genuine diagnosis (Yates & Feldman, 2016). For example, FPP patients 
may indicate unlikely fluctuations in the course of their reported disorder or may report 
extremely serious symptoms only characteristic of the most severe cases (Feldman, 2004). This 
may be strategic in nature, in effort to appear very ill to avoid discharge. Because of preparation 
for FPPs, some patients possess an unusually high amount of medical or psychological 
knowledge (Yates & Feldman, 2016). Despite preparation, Yates et al. (2018) indicated symptom 
presentations of patients may overly rely on stereotypes of the presumed mental disorder in their 
efforts to simulate a genuine disorder.  
As part of their adaptation, Lawlor and Kirakowski (2014) found that many individuals 
strongly embrace the sick role of the patient and adopt it as a large part of their self-identity. 
Thus, it benefits them in providing a stronger sense of self (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014). 
Additionally, some patients with FPPs appear to enjoy the treatment environment. Therefore, the 
benefits of feigning outweigh the risks because of the ongoing gratification and strong sense of 
identity obtained.  
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A sense of mastery that comes from deceptive behavior constitutes an additional salient 
theme within the adaptational model for factitious presentations (Feldman, Hamilton, & Deemer, 
2001). Patients likely achieve a sense of accomplishment because they mastered their FPP 
(Feldman et al., 2001). If factitious patients are dependent on care received and this behavior is 
reinforced, these individuals can obtain enjoyment and a self-impression of attainment (Lawlor 
& Kirakowski, 2014). Attainment may then provide a sense of validation to FPP patients and 
their inability to cope (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014). The joy brought about by accomplishing 
something may outweigh the potential adversarial consequences of being caught. In contrast to 
Lawlor and Kirakowski’s (2014) conceptualization of FPP as a means of providing a stable 
identity, a sense of mastery may provide individuals a feeling of control over one’s 
circumstances. This achievement may then become integrated with their conceptualization of 
themselves. Thus, the reward from a sense of accomplishment may, in turn, provide validation 
and contribute to a more stable sense of identity in viewing oneself in the patient role.  
The underlying motivation of factitious behavior is presumed to be present without 
external incentives, though most researchers agree that the behavior is both intentional and 
conscious (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2009; Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014). The conscious and 
intentional production of factitious behavior may serve an adaptive role, as there appear to be 
psychological incentives and general awareness that their illness is not real (Hamilton et al., 
2009). Because the goal of engaging in factitious behavior largely appears to be an elicitation of 
nurturance, attention, and care from others, these motivations can be viewed as adaptive in 
nature. Lawlor and Kirakowski (2014) found that most individuals have reported reflecting upon 
their reasoning for engaging in factitious behavior, which further supports the notion that 
factitious presentations are both conscious and intentional.  
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Turner (2006) asserts that the motivation for factitious presentations is neither conscious 
nor intentional, and cites the concept of self-harm as his reasoning for this assertion. He argues 
that because blatant self-harm is present in many factitious cases, we must consider this crucial 
aspect (Turner, 2006). However, it is worth noting, such cases of obvious self-harm are typically 
limited to extreme cases of physical factitious disorder. In such severe cases, desired services 
appear to outweigh all other considerations involving one’s well-being. The psychological 
incentives, such as attention and care received, might only be achieved through FPPs when other 
options may not be viable (Hamilton et al., 2009). Though not all scholars agree, it is a general 
consensus that the motivation for engaging in factitious behavior is both conscious and 
intentional in nature.  
Nurturance Model 
The nurturance model is especially important to understanding the underlying motivation 
of FPPs, because it appears to be unique to factitious presentations. With the three other 
explanatory models, motivations and behavior may distinguish malingering and FPP from one 
another, while sharing the same core features. However, the nurturance model focuses 
specifically on factitious disorders and FPPs.  
“Playing the sick role” of a patient is a defining component of the disorder, and is 
associated with the need for sympathy and compassion (Feldman, 1996). It is termed “playing” 
because persons are either fabricating or exaggerating symptoms to fit the role of what they 
believed to mirror truly sick patients. Individuals engaging in factitious behavior appear to have 
a longing for nurturance, sympathy, and compassion, along with a prominent need for the 
detachment from stressors and demands of their actual lives (Feldman, 2004). Through the 
display of care and concerns that treatment providers and caretakers give them, factitious patients 
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fulfill their need for nurturance from caretakers and treatment providers. Additionally, access to 
resources in the healthcare system and important privileges and dispensations are also provided 
(Feldman, 2004). Lawlor and Kirakowski (2014) found the desire for affection was the most 
commonly cited reason for engaging in factitious behavior. Patients with FPPs appear to thrive 
off the affection and care of others, feelings of uniqueness, and attention that participating in 
deceptive behavior brings them (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014).    
Playing the sick role can develop into a dependency on treatment providers and the 
nurturance received. Cunnien (1997) concluded that for many patients with factitious disorders, 
obtaining medical or psychiatric care fulfills substantial needs of dependency. Factitious patients 
are typically unusually receptive to psychiatric hospitalization, likely due to the dependent nature 
of these patients (Parker, 1996). A simulation study using advanced doctoral students to feign 
FPPs found the factitious-dependent group was characterized by (a) difficulty getting needs met 
in personal relationships, (b) a high motivation for treatment, and (c) lack of social support 
(Rogers, Jackson, & Kaminski, 2005).  
The development of unrealistic and idealized views of mental health professionals may 
arise from continuing needs for nurturance and dependency. Though not well researched, FPPs 
are thought to be promoted by an overinvestment in mental healthcare professionals (Rogers, 
Sewell, & Gillard, 2010). Catalina, Macias, and de Cos (2008) found the desire for intense 
relationships went beyond the professional staff to other patients and their families. It seems that 
patients with FPP may be bolstering self-views by strongly invested, if not romanticized, 
relationships with healthcare professionals. The nurturance model may consequently be 




Conceptual Models of Factitious Psychological Presentations 
Component Author(s) Key Findings 
Pathogenic Model 
Underlying disorder 
Yates et al. (2018) FPP emerges from psychopathology to alleviate severe stressors. 
Yates et al. (2018) FPP is an amplification of real, preexisting symptoms about which there is a lack of insight. 
Lawlor & Kirakowski (2014) FPP can occur when genuine disorders feel invalidated. 
Parker (1996) Traits and disorders (e.g., hypochondriasis and depression) may be present and contribute to FPP. 
Helplessness Feldman (2004) FPP is maintained by feeling trapped and helpless. 
Severe fear Lawlor & Kirakowski (2014) FPP is maintained by fears of disclosing, the loss of trust and support, as well as the loss of a coping method via FPP. 
Addictive Lawlor & Kirakowski (2014) Based on the excessive appetite model (Orford, 2001), FPP becomes emotional rewarding and eventually addictive. 
Demanding Yates et al. (2018) Those with FPP have inordinate comfort with playing the patient role and are demanding of treatment and care.  
Criminological Model 
Antisocial traits  Yates & Feldman (2016) FPP emerges from an antisocial background involving fraud and manipulativeness.  
Manipulative Yates & Feldman (2016) FPP is maintained by desire to manipulate and control others. 
Pathological lying Yates et al. (2018); Feldman (2004) 
FPP is associated with interpersonal deception, sometimes without any 
perceived motivation. 




Component Author(s) Key Findings 
Adaptational Model 
Trade-off  Feldman (2004) Without better options, FPP allows patients to meet psychological needs at the price of dependency. 
Coping mechanism Lawlor & Kirakowski (2014) Living with stress, FPP provides a method of avoidance and control.  
Strategic denial Lawlor & Kirakowski (2014) FPP is maintained by different deceptions. When confronted, options include denial and disengagement. 
Identity Lawlor & Kirakowski (2014) FPP is maintained by providing a more stable identity. 
Sense of mastery Feldman et al. (2001) Faced with many adversities, FPP provides a sense of mastery and control over one’s circumstances. 
Nurturance Model 
Unmet needs for caring Feldman (1996) FPP emerges from a persistent desire for nurturance, sympathy and compassion. 
Patient status Lawlor & Kirakowski (2014) FPP is maintained by the desire for assuming sick role with its heightened status and privileges. 
Dependency Feldman (2004) Consistent with unmet needs, FPP promotes the identification of health providers as the primary, if not sole, role as care-givers. 
Idealized relationship Rogers, Sewell & Gillard (2010) 
FPP is promoted by an overinvestment in the mental health professionals, who 
are often admired if not idealized. 




A dearth of research exists on factitious disorders, particularly with psychological 
presentations. The limited research available has examined various conceptual components of 
factitious disorder, but not in a systematic fashion. As a result, factitious disorder does not appear 
to be well understood and significant issues endure. The diagnostic legitimacy of factitious 
disorder as a formal DSM diagnosis remains questionable. In practice, clinicians are faced with 
formidable challenges in distinguishing malingering from factitious disorder. As an alternative to 
formal diagnosis, FPPs may be more accurately considered a dimensional construct, parallel to a 
malingering V code. They could then be considered a response style that may vary over time and 
circumstances. 
Building on Rogers (1990a, 1990b) explanatory models of malingering, four explanatory 
models for FPPs were considered for the current study. Three parallel malingering (pathogenic, 
criminological, adaptational), but differ in their central features, and an additional model of 
nurturance was added. Expanding on previous conceptual research on explanatory models of 
FPPs (Velsor & Rogers, 2019), the current study’s purpose was to provide validation for a newly 
developed measure assessing FPPs, the Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems (I-SIP; 
Rogers & Velsor, 2017). The study examined construct validity of the I-SIP via theoretically 
related and unrelated conceptual elements of FPPs.  
Development and Initial Validation of the I-SIP 
The Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems (I-SIP; Rogers & Velsor, 2017) was 
developed in response to the need for an evaluation tool assessing for factitious psychological 
response styles. The I-SIP is based on a thorough review of factitious literature delineating 
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conceptual elements of factitious disorder. Moreover, the explanatory models of FPPs detailed in 
Velsor and Rogers (2019) constitute the primary foundations for the I-SIP.  
The I-SIP is comprised of 60 items (22 FPP items, 16 Filler items, 22 Antisocial items). 
FPP items include motivational elements central to factitious psychological presentations, such 
as treatment needs or assuming the role of the patient. FPP items are the primary focus of the I-
SIP and are divided into several subscales detailed in the following paragraph and Table 2. Filler 
items cover a variety of topics meant to motivate no particular pattern of responding such as, 
“Sometimes I don’t think I have as much fun as most persons on the weekends.” These items are 
included to reduce the overall face validity of the I-SIP, as tests with higher face validity are 
more easily feigned (Tan, Slick, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2002). The Antisocial items inquire about 
persons’ general antisocial traits, such as manipulativeness or taking advantage of others. Items 
assessing for antisocial characteristics are included to assist with differentiation between 
response styles (i.e., malingering vs. FPPs).  
Table 2 
Conceptual Elements of I-SIP FPP subscales 
FPP Subscale Primary Conceptual Elements Example Item 
Cost-benefit 
analysis 
Better than other alternatives or the only 
perceived choice 
I don’t like being so dependent on my 
doctors or counselors, but I don’t see any 




Intensely dependent or invested 
relationships with doctors or healthcare 
providers 
I sometimes feel terrible that counselors 
are the only persons in my life that really 
care for me. 
Treatment needs 
Crisis based, helplessness, intense feelings 
of fear, and potential fears of 
abandonment by professionals 
When counselors say I am improving, I 
am sometimes frightened they will 
abandon me and try to convince them not 
to. 
Patient role Patient role is part of one’s identity  
Even when treatment helps me, I 
sometimes feel trapped in the role of 




The FPP scale contains 4 subscales, each focusing on a different central feature of FPPs 
(see Table 2). Themes from the pathogenic, adaptational, and nurturance model are included in 
the FPP scale. The criminological model was omitted from the creation of the I-SIP, because 
antisocial motivations appear to be more salient for malingering than FPPs. 
An examination of item content was warranted for the initial validation of the I-SIP. A 
prototypical analysis was conducted to examine agreement on FPP items among four experts on 
factitious disorder. Originally, there were 26 FPP items; 4 were removed due to low agreement 
among experts. On the remaining items, there was a 98.9% concordance rate in regard to the 
items being representative of FPPs. The prototypical analysis extended to the FPP subscales, in 
which experts rated how important an item was to a particular subscale. Experts rated the item on 
a scale from 1 - 7 (1 = not important to this FPP category, 2 = slightly important to this FPP 
category, 3 = below average importance, 4 = average importance, 5 = above average 
importance, 6 = important to this FPP category, 7 = very important to this FPP category). 
Classification of each subscale was based on (1) ratings of > 5 (above average importance 
to FPP category) and were included on one scale only and (2) > 5 (above average importance to 
FPP category) and > .5 points higher than other scales. In general, agreement among experts was 
high for the inclusion of items on each subscale. The patient role subscale possessed the highest 
average prototypical ratings (M = 6.89), indicating a high level of agreement among experts. The 
cost-benefit analysis subscale comprised the lowest prototypical ratings (M = 5.67), but all 
ratings were still rated above average importance or higher. In fact, experts were in agreement 
that all items within each subscale were at least of above average importance to the 
corresponding FPP subscale.  
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 
Do the I-SIP FPP and ASC scales constitute homogenous constructs? 
 
The first research question investigated whether the I-SIP FPP and Antisocial (ASC) 
scales constituted homogenous constructs with high alphas and inter-item correlations in the 
expected range (.15 to .50). 
Hypothesis 1: The FPP and ASC scales will have high alphas and acceptable 
inter-item correlations. 
 
Research Question 2 
Do the I-SIP FPP and ASC scales demonstrate convergent validity with established measures of 
therapeutic alliance, interpersonal orientation, and antisocial characteristics? 
 
Consistent with the Nurturance explanatory model, participants with factitious 
presentations were expected to be over-involved with the treatment process and demonstrate a 
higher need for nurturance. This is exemplified in Hypotheses 2 and 3 investigating the need for 
therapeutic alliance on the Working Alliance Inventory (WAI) and attentional and emotional 
needs on the Interpersonal Orientation Scale (IOS). Convergent validity was explored with the 
FPP scale of the I-SIP. With respect to the criminological model, malingering simulators were 
expected to demonstrate a higher level of antisocial traits than factitious simulators. This was 
explored in Hypothesis 4 examining antisocial characteristics on the Levenson Self-report 
Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) and convergent validity with the ASC scale on the I-SIP.  
Hypothesis 2: The FACT simulation condition will have higher correlations for the FPP 
scale with the WAI Bond subscale than the MAL simulation condition and Honest 
conditions.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The FACT simulation condition will have higher correlations for the FPP 
scale with the IOS Attentional and Emotional subscales than the MAL simulation 
condition and Honest conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The MAL simulation condition will have higher correlations on ASC scale 
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and the LSRP Primary Psychopathy and Secondary Psychopathy subscales than the 
FACT simulation and Honest conditions. 
 
Research Question 3 
Do the I-SIP FPP and ASC scales demonstrate discriminant validity with established measures of 
therapeutic alliance, interpersonal orientation antisocial characteristics? 
 
The third research question investigated opposite hypotheses of Research Question 2: 
whether established measures provide discriminant validity for characteristics of FPP and 
antisocial traits as measured on the I-SIP. This is exemplified in Hypotheses 5 and 6: Participants 
who are malingering were expected to evidence lower scores on the Working Alliance Inventory 
(WAI) and Interpersonal Orientation Scale (IOS) than factitious participants. Hypothesis 7 
explored discriminant validity of antisocial characteristics measured on the Levenson Self-report 
Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) with the ASC scale on the I-SIP. 
Hypothesis 5: The MAL simulation condition will exhibit lower correlations on the WAI 
Bond subscale with the FPP scale than the FACT simulation condition and Honest 
conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The MAL simulation condition will have lower correlations on the IOS 
Attentional and Emotional subscales than the FACT simulation condition and Honest 
conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The FACT simulation condition will have lower correlations on the LSRP 
Primary Psychopathy and Secondary Psychopathy subscales with the FPP scale than the 
MAL simulation condition. 
 
Research Question 4 
Does simulation condition (MAL vs. FACT) produce predicted differences on the I-SIP? 
 
The fourth research question addressed the effectiveness of the I-SIP in classification of 
response styles. Hypothesis 8 investigated whether rule-in and rule-out cut scores could be 




1. Identify FPP items on which the FACT simulation group scored significantly higher 
than the other three groups. 
2. Establish a rule-in FPP cut score so that the PPP > .80 for identifying the FACT 
simulation group. 
3. Establish a rule-out FPP cut score so that the NPP > .80 for excluding the FACT 
simulation group. 
Hypothesis 9 investigated whether rule-out and rule-in cut scores could be established for 
the MAL simulation group on a subset of items from the ASC scale using the following steps: 
1. Identify ASC items on which the MAL simulation group scored significantly higher 
than the other three groups. 
2. Establish a rule-in MAL cut score so that the PPP > .80 for identifying the MAL 
simulation group. 
3. Establish a rule-out MAL cut score so that the NPP > .80 for excluding the MAL 
simulation group. 
Hypothesis 8: The FACT simulation condition will have higher scores on the FPP scale 
and lower scores on the ASC scale than the MAL simulation condition and Honest 
conditions.  
 
Hypothesis 9: The MAL simulation condition will have higher scores on the ASC scale 
and lower scores on the FPP scale than the FACT simulation condition and Honest 
conditions.  
 
Research Question 5 
Will the SIMS cut scores be effective at differentiating the MAL simulation and FACT 
simulation conditions? 
 
It was predicted that SIMS cut scores would not distinguish between the MAL simulation 
group and FACT simulation group using the original SIMS Total Scores or the revised scales 
based detection strategies (e.g., Rare Symptoms [RS] and Symptom Combinations [SC] scales; 
Rogers, Robinson, & Gillard, 2014). This was predicted because the SIMS was designed to 
detect malingering, but not to distinguish between response styles (Rogers et al., 2005).  
Hypothesis 10: SIMS cut scores will not distinguish between the MAL simulation 
condition and FACT simulation condition (total scale and Rogers revised scales 
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(symptom combination and rare symptoms; Rogers et al., 2014). 
 
Supplementary Research Question 1 
Will simulators high in antisocial traits as measured by the LSRP will have differing sensitivity 
and predictive power than those low in antisocial traits on the SIMS scales?  
 
The first supplementary research question investigated the ability of antisocial traits as 
measured on the LSRP to predict classification of feigning on the SIMS. It was predicted that 
persons high in antisocial traits would have lower sensitivity and positive predictive power (PPP) 
than those low in antisocial traits on the SIMS scales. While some research has shown antisocial 
traits are not predictive of malingering (e.g., Impelen, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & à Campo, 2018), 
the findings are mixed.  
Supplementary Research Question 2 
Will gender differences be found on the I-SIP under the genuine condition? 
The second supplementary research question was examined to determine whether males 
and females score differently on the I-SIP.  This supplementary question is based on females’ 
stereotypically higher need for nurturance compared with males (Gnaulati & Heine, 2001; 
Williams, Giles, Edwards, Best, & Daws, 1977) and males higher antisocial characteristics 
(Falkenbach, Reinhard, & Larson, 2017; Rogstad & Rogers, 2008). With its inclusion of 
nurturance items, the FPP scale was hypothesized to be significantly higher for females than 






The current study utilized a within-subjects experimental design to examine the construct 
validity of the I-SIP. A within-subjects design was chosen because it maximizes statistical power 
of the simulation design by eliminating group differences present in between-subjects designs 
(see Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). In Phase 1, participants completed all measures in the honest 
condition, with the exception of the SIMS. Then, in Phase 2, participants were quasi-randomly 
assigned to a feigning simulation condition (i.e., MAL or FACT). They read a simulation 
scenario before completing the measures again under the assigned faking condition, allowing for 
direct comparisons between different feigning response styles on the I-SIP and selected measures 
to examine construct validity.  
The vast majority of research conducted on responses styles relies on simulation designs 
(Rogers, 2018). It is important to have a clinical comparison group comprised of persons with 
genuine mental disorders with no evidence of feigning (Rogers & Cruise, 1998). Even though the 
bulk of feigning research uses nonclinical participants assigned to a control group (i.e., standard 
instructions) and compares with clinical samples of convenience (Rogers, 2018), the current 
study circumvented this issue by the use of participants with genuine mental disorders from an 
inpatient treatment center.  
Instructions for the simulation condition must be clear and comprehensive and must 
challenge participants as a method for motivation (Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2009). There 
must also be appropriate incentives for successful simulation (Rogers, 2018). The current study 
provided monetary incentive for participants for completion of the study. In addition, a 
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manipulation check inquired about understanding of the simulation scenario and to ensure 
directions were followed adequately. Manipulation checks are imperative in simulation design 
research to establish comprehension of the study’s purpose and assess for appropriate effort 
(Crighton, Marek, Dragon, & Ben-Porath, 2017). The current study incorporated all features 
central to simulation designs in the evaluation of response styles.  
Participants 
Participants consisted of inpatients recruited from a private psychiatric hospital, 
University Behavioral Health (UBH) in Denton, TX. All participants were 18 years of age or 
older. Based on previous research conducted at this facility, the sample was expected to include 
approximately equal numbers of males and females and a variety of racial/ethnic composition.  
Exclusion criteria were minimal. Participants were not excluded because of age, unless 
they were under 18. If participants were experiencing severe substance withdrawal or psychiatric 
symptoms that may hinder their ability to participate or make them especially vulnerable, they 
were to be excluded from the study. An additional exclusion criterion included a reading level 
lower than 7th grade, as measured by the WRAT 4 reading subtest. This exclusion ensured 
adequate reading comprehension on surveys the participants completed during the study. 
Measures 
Demographic Information 
Basic demographic information was gathered via self-report from participants. This brief 
questionnaire included self-identified gender, age, self-identified ethnicity, primary language, 
and marital status (see Appendix A). In addition, information on education level and current 
occupational status was also collected. Participants were also asked to recall their number of 
previous psychiatric hospitalizations. 
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Symptom Measurement: DSM-5 Cross Cutting Measure 
The DSM-5 Self Rated Level 1 Cross Cutting Symptom Measure - Adult (APA, 2013) is 
a brief transdiagnostic measure developed to monitor patient treatment progress. It has been used 
in research as an evaluation as tools to enhance clinical decision-making. Items have been shown 
to be rated reliably by adult patients, with ICCs in the good to excellent range (0.60-1; Narrow et 
al., 2013). The DSM-5 Cross Cutting measure has demonstrated good internal consistency and 
clinical utility (Clarke, & Kuhl, 2014).  
Reading Level: WRAT 4 
The Wide Range Achievement Test, 4th Edition (WRAT 4), Word Reading Subtest 
(Wilkinson & Roberston, 2006) is a norm-referenced test that measures basic academic skills of 
word reading that corresponds to a grade equivalent reading level. It is commonly used to assess 
reading ability for psychological testing in forensic settings (Himsl, Burchett, Tarescavage, & 
Glassmire, 2017). Overall, the WRAT 4 has high levels of internal consistency, with reports 
ranging from .92 to .98. The word reading subtest has moderate internal consistency with 
reliability coefficients reported ranging from .87 to .93 (Wilkinson & Roberston, 2006).  
Construct Validity Measures 
Interpersonal Orientation Scale (IOS) 
The Interpersonal Orientation Scale (Hill, 1987) is a brief measure that focuses on 4 
dimensions assumed to underlie affiliation motivation. Overall, the IOS has good internal 
consistency, with alphas ranging from .70 to .86. The Attentional and Emotional support 
subscales, which will be used in the current study, have evidenced internal consistency alphas of 
.80 and .90, respectively. Test-retest reliability coefficients are also excellent at .90 for the 
Attentional subscale, and .81 for the Emotional support subscale (Hill, 1987). 
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Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems (I-SIP) 
The I-SIP (Rogers & Velsor, 2017) is a brief self-report measure for assessing responses 
styles associated with factitious psychological presentations. It contains 4 rationally developed 
subscales measuring components of FPPs: cost-benefit analysis, intensely dependent or invested 
relationship with doctors and health professionals, treatment needs, and patient role as part of 
one’s identity. Reliability statistics are not available for the I-SIP, because it is a newly 
developed measure. A primary goal of this dissertation is to provide construct validity for the I-
SIP.  
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale 
The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) is a 
brief measure intended to assess both primary and secondary psychopathy traits. It was first 
developed for use in research and has been validated on both offender and non-offender samples. 
The internal consistency coefficients of the Primary and Secondary psychopathy subscales are 
.82 and .63, respectively (Levenson et al., 1995).  
Working Alliance Inventory-Short Form Revised (WAI-SR). 
The WAI-SR (Horvath, 1992; Revision Tracey & Kokotowitc, 1989) is a brief measure 
that assesses the alliance between a patient and treatment staff. It assesses agreement on tasks 
and goals of therapy and the development of an effective bond. Cronbach’s alphas for the 
subscales of the WAI-SR for both inpatient and outpatient samples are good (α > 0.80), and 
excellent for the WAI-SR total score (α > 0.90).  
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Malingering Measure: Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) 
The SIMS (Widows & Smith, 2004) is a brief true-false self-report measure designed to 
screen for malingered psychopathology and cognitive symptoms. It includes five non-
overlapping scales: Amnestic Disorders (AM), Psychosis (P), Neurologic Impairment (NI), 
Affective Disorders (AF), and Low Intelligence (LI). The SIMS total score is used as a general 
feigning screen and evidences high internal consistency (α=.88) with a suggested cut score of 
>14 for identifying potential feigners. It has also been shown to have good discriminant validity 
(Widows & Smith, 2004).  Rogers et al. (2014) developed two new feigning scales for the SIMS 
based on well-established detection strategies: Rare Symptoms (RS) and Symptom Combinations 
(SC). SC refer to pairs of symptoms that infrequently co-occur in genuine patient populations, 
but are endorsed at higher rates by those feigning. RS are those that are very uncommon (i.e., < 
10%), even in genuine clinical samples (Rogers et al., 2014). The RS scale was shown to be 
moderately effective at differentiating genuine and feigning groups and the SC scale has good 
specificity (.67) and excellent sensitivity (.98; Rogers et al., 2014). A meta-analysis conducted 
by van Impelen, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Merten (2014) found the SIMS to be effective at 
distinguishing between feigners and genuine responders and has been shown to produce elevated 
scores in populations known to have a heightened prevalence of feigning.   
Operationalization of Groups 
Standard Instructions 
The standard instructions for the current study were communicated verbally. Participants 
were told they would be filling out multiple self-report surveys. They were asked to be forthright 
about their current level of functioning and to put forth their best effort and to answer honestly. 
Participants were told their job is to provide an accurate picture of their current psychological 
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issues and experienced symptoms.  
General Feigning Instructions  
After completing the surveys in the honest condition (standard instructions) participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two feigning conditions (malingering vs. factitious). Prior to 
receiving specific instructions, all participants were asked to role-play an outpatient at a private 
clinic receiving weekly individual therapy from his or her psychologist for the past six months. 
Participants were also asked to assume that they are financially comfortable and clinically stable 
with no mental health crises.  
Participants were challenged to see if they can “beat the tests” while avoiding detection. 
This was in effort to provide motivation and incentive to participants to try to successfully 
simulate. A need to invest participants with a sense of personal involvement is crucial for 
implication of successful simulation design research (Rogers, 2018). Participants were provided 
monetary compensation of $10 for completion in the study to provide additional incentive. It is 
essential that simulation instructions are comprehensible, specific, and provide context for 
participants. Simulation design research should also include detection-based coaching, in which 
participants are informed about potential detection-based strategies (Rogers, 2018). Therefore, 
the current study cautioned participants about feigning indicators and encourage them to respond 
in a believable fashion. The study also included a manipulation check at the end to ensure 
accurate recall of the simulation instructions along with a self-appraisal of effort.  
Specific Factitious Psychological Presentation (FACT) Instructions 
Participants in this condition were asked to role-play outpatients adulating their 
psychologists and wanting more services as needy patients, immersed in the sick role. They were 
asked to role-play that they often feel trapped in this role, and sometimes overplay their 
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symptoms to meet their psychological needs, for fear of abandonment, and loss of support. The 
FACT simulation instructions were based on conceptual elements delineated in Velsor & Rogers 
(2019) article on explanatory models of FPPs. The Flesh-Kincaid reading level of the FACT 
simulation instructions is 7.4. Participants were given the following description to read:  
• Unmet needs: You admire your current psychologist, Dr. Jones, and her therapeutic 
abilities very much. However, you have become frustrated that the clinic only allows 30-minute 
sessions every other week. She is the only psychologist that truly understands you. You feel 
accepted and cared for when you are with her and nothing fulfills you like seeing Dr. Jones and 
being involved at the mental health clinic.  
• Intensive treatment: You recently learned that Dr. Jones provides intensive outpatient 
treatment with 2-3 sessions every week. Though, this is only for clients in need of more care. If 
only you could be seen daily. You decide it is up to you convince her of your urgent needs to be 
a part of this special program.  
• Your goal: You try to help Dr. Jones understand: 
1. Your urgent psychological needs and that she is the only person to truly help you. 
2. That she is much more than a doctor to you. 
3. That you would do anything, even exaggerate your symptoms, to get the treatment 
you need. This is the only way to show Dr. Jones how much you really need her 
help. But, you need to make it believable or the psychologist will know you are 
exaggerating. 
Specific Malingering (MAL) Instructions 
Participants in this condition were asked to assume the role of outpatients in danger of 
losing their positions as well-paid professionals in a company that is downsizing. Participants 
were presented with an alternative to job termination, namely the feigning of a disability claim 
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that would bring generous compensation. The Flesh-Kincaid reading level for the malingering 
simulation instructions is 7.1. Participants were given the following description:  
• Your job is in jeopardy: You know that more jobs will be cut. As a highly paid 
professional, your career is on the chopping block. You fear your job will be cut next. You want 
a way out. If you could appear disabled, you could secure your financial future, and avoid being 
fired. You would also no longer have to work. You deserve some rewards at their expense after 
all your work. Plus, you have your private disability insurance that would pay you generously.  
• Your solution: Naturally, you are stressed and upset by your current circumstances, 
but are not really disabled. If you are going to succeed, you have to prove that you are unable to 
function at your profession (i.e., 100% disabled).  
• Your goal: You need to look severely disabled and unable to function at work. But, 
you need to make it believable or the psychologist will know you are cheating. Overplay your 
psychological symptoms so you are able to prove you are unfit to work, but are still able to get 
your disability claim.   
Procedures 
Recruitment 
Participants were recruited via a verbal announcement by the researcher during their free 
time period in the common room at the psychiatric hospital. No written recruitment material was 
used for the current study. Participants completed the study on a voluntary basis.  
An announcement was made briefly discussing the study's purpose, that it would have no 
influence on their treatment at UBH, and willing participants would then go with the researcher 
in a private group therapy room to complete the study. The study was run in groups of 2-4 
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participants. After completion of the study, participants were then compensated $10 for their 
participation.  
Informed Consent 
Informed consent processes are a key element in ethical clinical research and aims to 
assure participant understanding of the study (Palmer, Savla, Roesch, & Jeste, 2013). In the 
current study, participants first read the informed consent form and were given an opportunity to 
ask the researcher any questions. Consent was also discussed verbally and participants were 
asked to explain it in their own words to ensure comprehension of study purposes and 
procedures. Study procedures and consent processes were explained in the small groups the 
research is being conducted in (i.e., 2-4 participants) in a private group therapy room. After 
participants demonstrated understanding, they provided their consent by signing the informed 
consent form. A copy of the informed consent document was provided to participants upon 
request.  
Anonymity and Confidentiality  
Confidentiality in research settings involves the management of private information and 
protects the autonomy of individual’s right to maintain secrecy and privacy of this information 
(Giordano, O'Reilly, Taylor, & Dogra, 2007). In the current study, the participants' names only 
appeared on the informed consent forms. The consent forms were kept completely separate from 
the rest of the data that is coded only with a participant number. This is in effort to ensure 
protection of participants’ confidentiality as both a research participant as a patient at UBH.  
To further protect confidentiality, only basic demographic information was collected 
(e.g., age, ethnicity, gender). No information was collected that is believed to be identifiable and 
able to be linked to the participants. The hard copies of the data were kept in a locked research 
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lab office. Informed consent forms with participants’ names were stored and kept separate from 
the paper data copies in a locked research lab office. 
Phase I 
After providing consent, participants were assigned participant IDs, which were used to 
link data without the collection of identifying information. Phase I, in which participants 
answered measures honestly under standard instructions was conducted first. This was to reduce 
confusion once participants are given a simulation scenario (MAL or FACT) and were instructed 
to assume the role of the person in the scenario.  
In the separate group therapy room from where consent was obtained, participants were 
administered the WRAT 4 individually to assess reading level. Individual administrations of the 
WRAT 4 safeguard against other participants potentially overhearing the content and assure 
participant responses are their own. The purpose was to ensure adequate comprehension of the 
subsequent administered measures. If participants had lower than a 7th grade reading level, their 
data was to be excluded from the study.  
Following the administration of the WRAT 4, participants completed the DSM Cross 
Cutting Measure to assess symptomology. The next measures administered included the 
construct validity component of the study. Participants completed the subsequent measures under 
standard instructions to serve as a comparative basis for feigning conditions. The only measure 
participants did not complete under standard instruction is the SIMS. This is because the SIMS is 
being used to assess for differences in response styles between the malingering and factitious 
simulation conditions, and would likely not add substantial incremental validity to the study if 
administered under standard instructions (i.e., participants answering honestly). The WAI-SR 
was administered to assess therapeutic bond, and the IOS to measure emotional support and 
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attentional needs. Next, participants were administered the LSRP scale to assess antisocial traits. 
Finally, participants completed the I-SIP to assess factitious psychological response styles.  
Phase II 
Following phase I, participants completed measures under one of two previously quasi-
randomly assigned feigning conditions (MAL vs. FACT). They were asked to read a scenario 
and to assume the role of the person in the scenario. Participants were asked to summarize the 
goal of the scenario in their own words to ensure understanding. In the feigning condition, 
participants completed the aforementioned surveys again (WAI-SR, IOS, LSRP, and I-SIP). 
Participants also completed the SIMS to assess for malingered responding.  
Manipulation Check After Phase II 
Participants were given a manipulation check (see Appendix B) to ensure adequate effort 
and understanding of the study. They were asked to summarize their instructions throughout both 
Phase I and II and asked to list specific components of the scenario in the feigning condition to 
the researcher. This was to establish participants’ understanding that they were to first answer the 
surveys honestly, and then assume the role of the person in the scenario when answering them a 
second time.  
Participants were also asked to rate their effort during the study on a scale of 1-10 (1 = 
didn’t try at all, 10 = tried my hardest). Participants who self-rated their effort as less than 7 were 
to be excluded from data analysis. Participants who failed to understand the purposes of the 
study or list specific components of the scenario were also to be excluded from data analysis. An 




Research Question 1 
Alpha coefficients and inter-item correlations were examined to assess for scale 
homogeneity. 
Research Questions 2 and 3 
The statistical analyses are summarized for Hypotheses 2 through 7: 
Bivariate Pearson correlations were conducted to examine the correlations between the 
established measures and the theoretically similar and dissimilar domains on the I-SIP. Rogers 
and colleagues rigorous correlation standards were utilized: .35 for moderate, .53 for large, and 
.60 for very large (Rogers, 2008; Rogers & Bender, 2018; Rogers, Williams, Winningham, & 
Sharf, 2018).  
Research Question 4 
Statistical analyses for are summarized for Hypotheses 8 and 9: 
Utility estimates were calculated in order to determine the effectiveness of the I-SIP in 
ruling-in and ruling-out (a) the FACT simulation group (8) and (b) MAL simulation group (9). 
Utility estimates include sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive power (PPP), negative 
predictive power (NPP) and overall correct classification (OCC). 
Research Question 5 
Utility estimates were calculated to examine the SIM’s effectiveness in discriminating 
between response styles. Utility estimates include sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive 
power (PPP), negative predictive power (NPP) and overall correct classification (OCC). 
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Supplementary Research Question 1 
Utility estimates were conducted to investigate the impact of antisocial traits on SIMS 
feigning classification. Utility estimates include sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive power 
(PPP), negative predictive power (NPP) and overall correct classification (OCC). 
Supplementary Research Question 2 
An ANOVA was conducted to examine differences in mean response patterns between 






The sample was comprised of 80 adult inpatients from University Behavioral Health 
(UBH), a private psychiatric hospital in North Texas. No participants withdrew from the current 
study. 
As detailed in the Method chapter, several manipulation checks were administered upon 
completion of the study to ensure participants included in subsequent analyses understood 
directions and were invested in the study. On average, participants recalled 92.0% of simulation 
details, indicating good retention of the scenario and its instructions. Additionally, all 
participants indicated they followed instructions in Phase 2 (i.e., simulation condition). In rating 
their efforts on a scale of 1 to 10, the average reported level was very high at 9.26 (SD = 0.81). 
All participants rated their effort above 7, which was the threshold for being included in the final 
sample. Besides the 10-point rating, they responded to a question about their perceived success at 
convincing the psychologist that they were sick and needed help. Overall, 70% answered “yes,” 
while 30% were uncertain; as a result, no participants were removed because of this final 
manipulation check. In summary, all participants successfully completed the three manipulation 
checks and were included in the final sample. 
Reading level was collected via the WRAT 4 Word Reading subtest to ensure a sufficient 
understanding of study instructions and adequate comprehension of the surveys. The average 
reading level of the sample was 12.02 (SD = 1.13), which clearly surpasses the simulation 
scenarios with their Flesh-Kincaid grade levels of 7.1 (MAL) and 7.4 (FACT). With all reading 
levels measuring above grade 8.0, no participants were excluded on this basis.  
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Description of the Sample 
Demographic variables for the overall sample are presented in Table 3 as well as by 
assigned simulation condition (MAL and FACT). Regarding self-identified gender, the overall 
sample contained slightly more females (n = 43 or 53.8%) than males. Overall, participants 
averaged 31.25 years old (SD = 10.92) and ranged from 18 to 65 years. A large portion of the 
overall sample self-identified as European American (n = 39 or 48.8%). The rest identified as 
African American (23.8%), Hispanic/Latino (17.5%), multiracial (8.8%), and other (1.3%). For 
marital status, half of the participants reported being single, while 26.3% were married, and 
23.8% were divorced.  
Table 3 
Differences in MAL and FACT Groups on Demographic and Background Variables 
Demographics/Background 
Total Sample 
(N = 80) 
FACT 
(n = 40) 
MAL 
(n = 40) 
χ2 p 
N Col % n Row % n 
Row 
% 
Self-Identified Gender 1.26 .26 
Male 37 46.3 21 56.8 16 43.2   
Female 43 53.8 19 44.2 24 55.8   
Self-Identified Ethnicitya 2.79 .59 
African American 19 23.8 11 57.9 8 42.1   
European American 39 48.8 19 48.7 20 51.3   
Hispanic American 14 17.5 7 50.0 7 50.0   
Multiracial  7 8.8 2 28.6 5 71.4   
Education Level 1.66 .89 
Some High School 13 16.3 6 46.2 7 53.8   
HS Diploma/GED 22 27.5 11 50.0 11 50.0   
Some College/Associates 26 32.5 14 53.8 12 46.2   
Bachelor’s Degree 16 20.0 7 43.8 9 56.2   






(N = 80) 
FACT 
(n = 40) 
MAL 
(n = 40) 
χ2 p 
N Col % n Row % n 
Row 
% 
Marital Status 1.76 .41 
Single 40 50 21 52.5 19 47.5   
Married  21 26.3 8 38.1 13 61.9   
Divorced 19 23.8 11 57.9 8 42.1   
Employment Status 1.85 .40 
Employed 51 63.7 25 49.0 26 51.0   
Unemployed 23 28.7 11 47.8 12 52.2   
Disabled 5 6.3 4 80.0 1 20.0   
Note. FACT = Factitious Disorder; MAL = Malingering, a One participant listed “other” for self-identified ethnicity. 
 
The sample varied considerably in educational backgrounds and current employment 
status. Educationally, comparatively few 16.3% (n = 13) reported less than a high school 
education. The remaining disclosed having a high school diploma or GED (22 or 27.5%), some 
college, including an associate’s degree (26 or 32.5%), while the rest reported a bachelor’s 
degree or higher (19 or 23.8%). Regarding current employment status, the majority of the sample 
(51 or 63.7%) were gainfully employed, with smaller numbers being unemployed (23 or 28.7%) 
or on disability (5 or 6.3%).  
Participants demonstrated significant variability in regard to previous psychiatric 
hospitalizations, ranging from 0 to 31. In fact, 28.7% of participants reported the current 
psychiatric hospitalization to be their first admission. For the overall sample the average number 
was 3.48 previous hospitalizations (SD = 4.50). High frequency hospitalizations (i.e., > 10), 
occurred infrequently (7.5%) in the total sample.  
Predictably, the descriptive data for the two simulation groups were very similar because 
of the quasi-random method for group assignment. More specifically, no significant differences 
were observed between simulation groups with regard to gender, ethnicity, marital status, 
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education level, or employment status. A slight and definitely non-significant trend occurred for 
gender: more women (55.0%) than men (43.2%) being assigned to the MAL group. Similarly, as 
presented in Table 4, no significant differences occurred between simulation groups in regard to 
age or number of previous psychiatric hospitalizations. However, the FACT group had a slightly 
higher number of average hospitalizations than the MAL group.  
Table 4 




(N = 80) 
FACT 
(n = 40) 
MAL 
(n = 40) F p d 
M SD M SD M SD 
Age 31.59 10.43 30.70 10.22 32.48 10.71 .58 .45 0.17 
Prior Psychiatric 
Hospitalizations 3.48 4.50 3.60 4.21 3.35 4.83 .81 .81 0.06 
Note. FACT = Factitious Disorder; MAL = Malingering 
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 
RQ1 asked whether the I-SIP FPP and ASC scales constitute homogenous constructs. To 
investigate scale homogeneity, alphas and inter-item correlations were examined. Table 5 
presents results for the FPP and ASC of the I-SIP for the honest condition.  
Table 5 
Scale Homogeneity for FPP, ASC, and Filler Scales 
Scale (# of items) α M inter-item r 
FPP (22) .86 .24 
ASC (22) .95 .50 
Filler (16) .76 .16 




Overall, analyses confirmed the FPP and ASC scales constitute homogeneous constructs 
with excellent alpha coefficients (.86 and .95 respectively), as unweighted averages substantially 
exceeded .80 (Nunnally, 1967). The FPP evidenced good scale homogeneity (α = .86) and had 
average inter-item correlations (r = .24) in the optimal range between .15 and .50 (Clark & 
Watson, 1995). Similarly, the ASC of the I-SIP demonstrated excellent alpha coefficients (α = 
.95) but its average inter-item correlations were at the high end of this acceptable range (r = .50). 
Unexpectedly, the Filler scale evidenced a moderate alpha (α = .76). Perhaps the items were not 
functioning as they were originally intended (i.e., without any particular pattern of responding).  
Instead, participants averaged 70.1% affirmative responses to Filler items. The Discussion 
examines potential reasons for the unexpectedly high reliability of the Filler scale.  
The scale homogeneity of the FPP subscales varied considerably, with alpha coefficients 
ranging from .45 to .68 (see Table 6). When examining inter-item correlations across subscales, 
all inter-item correlations averaged in the acceptable range for FPP subscales (r = .16 - .44).   
Table 6 
Scale Homogeneity for FPP Subscales 
Subscale (# of items) α M inter-item r 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (4) .62 .32 
Relationships with Providers (7) .66 .21 
Treatment Needs (8) .45 .16 
Patient Role (3) .68 .44 
 
The lower than expected reliability of the FPP subscales brings up an important 
consideration: Should the FPP subscales be treated at subscales or just remain an overarching 
construct? While the overall FPP demonstrated good scale homogeneity, the homogeneity of the 
subscales was disappointing, ranging from unacceptable to marginal. The low number of items 
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on two subscales might partly explain the lack of strong alpha coefficients. To the contrary, the 
subscale with the highest number of items, Treatment Needs, produced the lowest scale 
homogeneity (α = .45).  
The Treatment Needs subscale was dropped due its unacceptable alpha that resulted in 
more than 50% non-systematic error (Streiner, 2003). The remaining three FPP subscales had 
marginal alphas.  Their output was examined for possible improvements in subscale 
homogeneity if particular items were removed. However, coefficients only increased negligible 
amounts (one or two hundredths of a point).  For example, the alpha for the Relationship with 
Providers subscale only increased from .66 to .68 with two items removed. As a result, no items 
were removed from the remaining subscales. 
Research Questions 2 and 3 
Research Question 2 examined whether established measures that correspond with 
conceptual elements of the I-SIP converge with expected FPP and ASC scales. Research 
Question 3 investigated discriminant validity of selected measured and expected scales (FPP and 
ASC). Variables used for research questions involving the construct validity of the I-SIP (i.e., 
Hypotheses 2 through 7) are summarized in Table 7. Hypotheses 2 through 4 examine 
convergent validity, while Hypotheses 5 through 7 predicted expectedly lower correlations 
aligned with discriminant validity.  
Intercorrelations for the overall scales of construct validity measures under honest and 
simulated conditions are presented in Tables 8 and 9, respectively. Results are presented for the 





Description of Construct Validity Measures Used in Analysis of Research Questions 
Subscale (# of items) Description 
I-SIP 
ASC (22) General antisocial characteristics and deceptiveness  
FPP (22) Factitious psychological responding  
 Cost-Benefit Analysis (4) Better than other alternatives or the only perceived choice  
 Relationships with Providers (7) 
Intensely dependent or invested relationships with doctors or 
healthcare providers 
 Patient Role (3) Patient role is part of one’s identity 
Filler (16) Items that would have no particular pattern of responding 
IOS 
Emotional Support (6) Need for empathy, compassion, and concern from others 
Attention (6) Need for others to take notice or view one as important or interesting 
Positive Stimulation (9) Satisfaction from interpersonal interactions and desire to be around others for positive stimulation 
Social Comparison (5) Tendency to compare self to others 
WAI 
Bond (3) Bond and connection to treatment providers  
Task (4) Positive approach to treatment and specific treatment tasks  
Goal (5) Working on mutually agreed upon goals in treatment  
LSRP 
Primary Psychopathy (16) Callousness, shallow affect, manipulation, superficial charm  




Construct Validity under Honest Conditions: FACT Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL 
Group (below the Diagonal) 
 
 I-SIP FPP Scale 
I-SIP ASC 
Scale IOS Total LSRP Total WAI Total 
I-SIP FPP Scale  .23 .50*** .40* .19 
I-SIP ASC Scale -.06  .05 .77*** -.24 
IOS Total .39* -.30  .35* .22 
LSRP Total .03 .89*** -.13  -.16 
WAI Total .08 -.48** .52*** -.45**  
Note.  FACT = Factitious Disorder; MAL = Malingering; I-SIP = Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems; FPP 
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= Factitious Psychological Presentation; ASC = Antisocial; IOS = I Interpersonal Orientation Scale; LSRP = 
Levenson Self-report Psychopathy Scale; WAI = Working Alliance Inventory; Bivariate Pearson Correlations were 
conducted to examine the level of convergence.  Convergent validity correlations are bolded. Discriminant validity 




Construct Validity under Simulated Conditions: FACT Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL 
Group (below the Diagonal) 
 
 I-SIP FPP Scale 
I-SIP ASC 
Scale IOS Total LSRP Total WAI Total 
I-SIP FPP Scale   .19 -.12 .07 .28 
I-SIP ASC Scale .59***  -.43** .71*** -.35* 
IOS Total .08 -.13   -.32* .44** 
LSRP Total .44** .87*** -.20  -.63*** 
WAI Total  -.17 -.41** .48** -.48**  
Note. FACT = Factitious Disorder; MAL = Malingering; I-SIP = Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems; FPP 
= Factitious Psychological Presentation; ASC = Antisocial; IOS = Interpersonal Orientation Scale; LSRP = 
Levenson Self-report Psychopathy Scale; WAI = Working Alliance Inventory; Bivariate Pearson Correlations were 
conducted to examine the level of convergence; Convergent validity correlations are bolded. Discriminant validity 
correlations are underlined.  For significance, * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Convergent Validity of the I-SIP 
The convergent correlates for the FPP with WAI failed to materialize for both FACT and 
MAL groups under honest as well as simulated conditions. In looking at correlates with the WAI 
subscales (see Appendix B, Supplementary Tables B.1 and B.2), most relationships remained 
non-significant. Of interest, FACT simulators appeared more invested in sharing treatment goals 
(r = .33) than their MAL counterparts (see Supplementary Table B.2). While less than ideal, the 
FPP for both honest groups evidenced the predicted convergent correlates with IOS, with the 
strongest pattern being the IOS Attention and Positive Stimulation subscales (see Supplementary 
Table B.3). Those expressing strong needs for the therapeutic relationship were clearly receiving 
positive interpersonal benefits from it.  
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However, surprising results occurred with the simulation conditions (see Supplementary 
Table B.4). Rather than play up the interpersonal importance and value of the relationship, the 
FACT group manifested a very slight negative relationship with the FPP. This led to a tentative 
hypothesis that some members of the FACT group were trying to bolster their treatment needs by 
expressing disappointment in their ongoing relationships with treatment providers. To explore 
this hypothesis, IOS scores were examined for the FACT group between honest and simulation 
conditions. The average score difference between honest and simulated groups was striking (M = 
43.80), with only 2 participants choosing to suppress their scores across conditions. In other 
words, the tentative hypothesis that individuals were attempting to strengthen treatment from 
providers by communicating dissatisfaction with relationships was not found.  
The MAL simulation group appeared to take a slightly different approach from their 
FACT counterparts. In stark contrast to the FACT group, malingerers suppressed IOS scores by 
an average of 9.75 points across honest and simulated conditions. Rather than emphasize their 
positive interpersonal needs, MAL group in the simulation condition showed with virtually no 
relationship between the FPP and IOS. Instead, the MAL group appeared more willing to express 
antisocial attitudes in their efforts to secure unwarranted financial gains, resulting in a large 
correlation (r = .59) between FPP and ASC. Item-level examples are particularly instructive for 
the MAL group. They include large correlates (rs > .53) with various FPP items, such as 
“making up stories to keep doctors interested” and “pretending to be in crisis to get a lot of 
professional attention.” Even more revealing was an ASC item addressing intentional harm, 
“causing hardships to others pays off for me,” which evidenced large positive correlations with 
several FPP items. In their simulation condition, malingerers almost appeared to take pride in 
presenting their non-conforming views.  
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The distributions of scores on construct validity measures were investigated as possibly a 
partial explanation for the disappointing convergent correlates. To this end, the WAI had a 
markedly large range of scores for both MAL and FACT groups under honest and simulated 
conditions. However, when comparing the data to previous research on psychiatric inpatients, 
similar averages are produced (M = 59.20; see Moreno et al., 2018). When examining score 
distribution of the WAI and IOS, the data generally followed the expected patterns (i.e., normally 
distributed for honest conditions, skewed to the high end for FACT, and low end for MAL). 
Even when a few minor outliers on the WAI and IOS were removed, correlations with the FPP 
did not improve. 
The relationships of FPP subscales to convergent constructs were next investigated to 
further understand the unexpected results (Supplementary Tables B.7 –B.10). Most had non-
significant relationships with the WAI under simulated conditions, with the exception of the 
Patient Role subscale for factitious simulators (r = .34). In particular, the WAI Bond and Goal 
subscales had the most substantial relationships with internalization of patient status 
(Supplementary Table B.8). It appears the identification of the patient role as part of one’s 
identity creates the desire for a strong connection with providers (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014). 
Contrastingly, the Patient Role subscale evidenced the largest negative correlations with the 
WAI for the MAL group (r = -.22, Supplementary Table B.8). Though this relationship was non-
significant, it suggests that malingerers are less vested in their relationships with treatment 
providers, particularly regarding their patient status.  
Furthermore, and as mentioned previously, the IOS and FPP evidenced moderate 
correlations when answering honestly for both FACT and MAL groups (Table 8). This finding 
provides at least modest support for the convergent validity of the FPP and IOS under standard 
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instructions. All three subscales of the FPP evidenced significant positive correlations with the 
FPP, with the Cost-Benefit Analysis subscale yielding the strongest relationship (r = .55; 
Supplementary Table B.3). Overall, while the examining the FPP subscale level provided a more 
nuanced approach, it did not fully explain the unexpected relations among construct-validity 
measures, particularly in regard to simulated conditions.  
Although not the primary focus of the I-SIP, the convergent validity of the ASC was 
exceptionally strong with the LSRP, a measure of psychopathy, under honest conditions for 
FACT (r = .77) and MAL (r = .89) (see Table 8).  . Moreover, these correlations followed a 
similarly strong pattern for simulated conditions at .71 and .87, respectively. As expected, LSRP 
Primary, the core features of psychopathy, produced the strongest correlations with the ASC 
(Tables B.5 and B.6). In contrasting two groups, the MAL group demonstrated a strong 
relationship with LSRP Secondary under honest and simulated conditions that were clearly 
higher than the FACT group. In subsequent analyses, differences in levels of psychopathy will be 
examined for both conditions via ANOVAs. 
Discriminant Validity of the I-SIP 
The relationships between FPP and the LSRP were predicted to be negative under both 
honest and simulated conditions; however, correlations proved to be much more variable. For the 
FACT group, a moderate correlation (r = .40) was observed under the honest condition, which 
virtually disappeared when participants were simulating (r = .07). The diametrically opposite 
pattern was observed the MAL group from honest (r = .03) to simulated (r = .44) conditions. The 
first pattern moved in the expected direction of diminishing the relationship from a moderately to 
minimally positive relationship. The second pattern was previously discussed as possibly 
displaying antisocial characteristics associated with feigned disability for financial gain.  
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It was predicted that FACT simulators would exhibit weaker relationships than MAL 
simulators on measures of antisocial characteristics. However, this investigation of discriminant 
validity was complicated by substantive differences under the honest conditions. As reported in 
Table 8, LSRP Total was more correlated with the MAL honest group (r = .89) than FACT 
honest group (r = .72). Taking into account this differences, the correlates do not strongly 
support this hypothesis. As slight evidence, the FACT group did evidence a small decrement on 
LSRP Primary from honest to simulated conditions (r = .85 to .80; see Supplementary Tables 
B.5 and B.6), which did not occur for the MAL group (r = .88 and .88). On LSRP Secondary, 
both groups decreased in the simulation condition with FACT being slightly larger (r = .55 to 
.42) than MAL (r = .81 to .72). Thus, these minimally positive findings remain insufficient to 
discriminant validity. 
For the WAI, the MAL simulation group produced the lowest correlation with the FPP 
and WAI Bond subscale (r = -.13; Supplementary Table B.2).  This finding was expected 
because it was presumed that those engaged in a malingering response style would be less 
invested in relationships with treatment providers than those feigning for internal reasons, such 
as desire for nurturance and attention from medical professionals (Feldman, 1996; Rogers et al., 
2010).  
Research Question 4 
RQ4 asked whether simulation condition (MAL vs. FACT) produce predicted differences 
on the I-SIP. Hypothesis 8 predicted FACT simulators would evidence higher scores on the FPP 
and lower scores on the ASC than the MAL simulation condition. Contrastingly, Hypothesis 9 
predicted MAL simulators would have higher scores on the ASC and lower scores on the FPP 
than the FACT simulation condition.  
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As the first step, the comparability of groups under the honest condition was examined 
(see Table 10). Despite quasi-random assignments, several generally small differences emerged 
with FACT being modestly higher on FPP and MAL showing a similar pattern on ASC and 
LSRP. Such findings might be understandable if the simulation condition had been administered 
first because some participants may have been primed for patient needs (FACT) or antisocially 
motivated feigned disability (MAL). However, this problem was circumvented by beginning 
with the standard administration (i.e., honest condition), which is the typical practice in 
simulation research (Merckelbach et al., 2009; Rogers, 2018). The potential effects of these 
modest patterns are considered in the Discussion. 
Impressive findings strongly support the construct validity of the I-SIP in differentiating 
factitious and malingering presentations (Table 11). As hypothesized, factitious simulators 
evidenced dramatically higher scores on the FPP than those malingering (d = 3.17). For FPP 
subscales, the Relationship with Providers performed the best of all measures (d = 3.62) with the 
FACT group averaging close to 80% of the total possible score. While not as striking, MAL 
simulators produced significantly higher scores on the ASC than the FACT simulation group (d 
= -0.68). Again, this pattern is consistent with expectations and suggests malingerers are likely to 
display more antisocial characteristics. 
Dramatically large disparities between MAL and FACT groups on the IOS also provided 
strong evidence of construct validity (Table 11). As predicted, FACT simulators endorsed 
extremely high levels of interpersonal orientation (IOS Total; d = 3.42). Marked discrepancy was 
observed across IOS subscales, with FACT respondents choosing to grossly exaggerate traits 
related to emotional support (d = 3.44) and positive stimulation (d = 3.64) compared with their 




Differences between FACT and MAL Simulation Groups on Construct Validity Measures under Honest Conditions 
Scale or Subscale (# of items) 
FACT 
n = 40 
MAL 
n = 40 F p d 
M SD M SD 
I-SIP FPP Scale (22) 37.73 10.20 33.10 8.65 1.54 .22 0.49 
I-SIP Cost-benefit (4) 6.88 2.62 5.93 2.41 2.84 .10 0.38 
I-SIP Relationship with Providers (7) 11.90 3.93 10.60 3.15 2.66 .11 0.37 
I-SIP Patient Role (3) 5.15 1.70 5.50 1.41 1.00 .32 -0.22 
I-SIP ASC Scale (22) 32.27   12.09 40.22 18.60 5.14 .03 -0.51 
I-SIP Filler Scale (16) 56.05 7.96 57.03 7.89 .30 .58 -0.12 
IOS Total (26) 70.18  13.96 72.10 14.37 .37 .55 -0.06 
IOS Emotional (6) 19.43 4.11 18.38 4.26 1.26 .27 0.25 
IOS Attention (6) 12.40 4.91 14.03 4.50 2.38 .13 -0.35 
IOS Positive Stimulation (9) 23.40 6.72 24.20 7.22 .26 .61 -0.11 
IOS Social Comparison (5) 14.95 3.25 15.50 2.94 .63 .43 -0.18 
WAI Total (12) 58.70 8.59 57.70 7.56 .31 .58 0.12 
WAI Bond (3) 13.98 2.56 14.08 2.26 .03 .85 -0.04 
WAI Task (4) 20.05 3.13 19.33 3.05 1.10 .30 0.23 
WAI Goal (5) 24.67 3.81 24.30 3.44 .21 .65 0.10 
LSRP Total (26) 49.88 13.72 61.40 18.83 9.79 .01 -0.70 
LSRP Primary Psychopathy (16) 26.80 8.02 34.18 11.01 11.73 .01 -0.77 
LSRP Secondary Psychopathy (10) 23.30 6.49 27.78 8.06 7.49 .01 -0.61 
Note. FACT = Factitious Disorder; MAL = Malingering; I-SIP = Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems; FPP = Factitious Psychological Presentation; 




Differences between FACT and MAL Simulation Groups on Construct Validity Measures under Simulated Conditions 
Scale or Subscale (# of items) 
FACT 
n = 40 
MAL 
n = 40 F p d 
M SD M SD 
I-SIP FPP Scale (22) 81.50 10.39 37.70 16.55 200.91 < .001 3.17 
I-SIP Cost-benefit (4) 15.05 2.37 7.08 3.41 147.50 < .001 2.71 
I-SIP Relationship with Providers (7) 27.72 3.69 11.50 5.16 261.25 < .001 3.62 
I-SIP Patient Role (3) 10.30 2.22 4.20 2.54 130.50 < .001 2.56 
I-SIP ASC Scale (22) 35.85 19.42 50.30 22.85    9.29 .01 -0.68 
I-SIP Filler Scale (16) 57.65 6.87 53.93 6.39    6.30 .01 0.41 
IOS Total (26) 113.98 12.57 62.35 17.29  233.42 < .001 3.42 
IOS Emotional (6) 27.47 2.82 14.50 4.53 235.76 < .001 3.44 
IOS Attention (6) 25.18 4.51 15.08 4.67  96.88 < .001 2.20 
IOS Positive Stimulation (9) 39.33 5.01 19.63 6.80 217.45 < .001 3.30 
IOS Social Comparison (5) 22.00 2.86 13.15 3.72 142.22 < .001 2.67 
WAI Total (12) 74.93 8.53 44.55 10.51 201.51 < .001 3.17 
WAI Bond (3) 19.10 2.45 10.67 2.94 194.14 < .001 3.12 
WAI Task (4) 24.50 3.12 15.18 3.72 147.48 < .001 2.71 
WAI Goal (5) 31.33 3.70 18.70 4.24 200.98 < .001 3.17 
LSRP Total (26) 51.62 14.97 74.42 21.71 29.89 < .001 -1.22 
LSRP Primary Psychopathy (16) 29.81 10.36 43.50 14.50 23.63 < .001 -1.09 
LSRP Secondary Psychopathy (10) 21.82 5.76 30.93 8.44 31.74 < .001 -1.26 
Note. FACT = Factitious Disorder; MAL = Malingering; I-SIP = Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems; FPP = Factitious Psychological Presentation; 
ASC = Antisocial; IOS = Interpersonal Orientation Scale; LSRP = Levenson Self-report Psychopathy Scale; WAI = Working Alliance Inventory. 
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As discussed with Hypothesis 6, the Emotional subscale of the IOS appears to represent a key 
distinction between FACT and MAL simulation presentations.  Consistent with nurturance 
explanations, factitious response styles appear to be particularly characterized by the purported 
need for the expression of empathy, compassion, and concern from others (Feldman, 1996, 
2004). 
FACT simulators also presented with strikingly stronger allegiance with treatment 
providers, as evidenced on the WAI Total (d = 3.17) and subscales. It was anticipated that the 
WAI Bond subscale of the WAI would demonstrate the greatest differences due to FPPs 
promoting an overinvestment in relationships with mental health professionals (Rogers et al., 
2010). However, the Bond and Goal subscales produced comparably extreme effect sizes. 
Regarding the latter, 92% of the FACT group endorsed the Bond item “My therapist and I are 
working on mutually agreed upon goals.” Taken together, this pattern of results suggests 
factitious simulators are much more likely to prioritize mutual therapeutic goals and strong 
affective bonds with treatment providers.  
As predicted, the I-SIP ASC clearly differentiated between malingering and factitious 
response styles with a large effect size (d = -1.22). The MAL simulation condition produced 
much higher LSRP total scores than typically found for offender samples (M = 55.84; Poythress 
et al., 2010). These differences were seen for both Primary (d = -1.09) and Secondary (d = -1.26) 
psychopathy. Participants motivated by monetary gain apparently prioritized endorsement of 
psychopathic lifestyle characteristics (e.g., a reduced capacity to regulate behavior), offering a 
clinically meaningful difference than the approach taken by FACT simulators.  
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The Utility of the I-SIP in Classifying Response Styles 
The effectiveness of the I-SIP in classifying FACT and MAL simulation groups 
represents a primary objective of this dissertation because no assessment measures differentiate 
between these types of feigning (Merten & Rogers, 2017). Not surprisingly, FPP clearly 
surpassed ASC in both ruling-in and ruling-out factitious presentations. Impressively, both FPP 
cut scores have outstanding specificities (1.00 each). Pending cross-validation, this classification 
appears to have direct clinical relevance to feigned presentations.  
Malingering should never be equated antisocial characteristics. DSM-5 attempts to use 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) as an indicator for malingering. However, this contributes 
to misperceptions on relying on common characteristics rather than discriminating traits to 
differentiate malingerers from non-malingerers (Rogers & Bender, 2018). As a result, ASC is 
understandably less effective that FPP in differentiating between the simulation categories (see 
Table 12). 
Table 12 
Effectiveness of the I-SIP at Differentiating FACT from MAL Simulation Groups 
Scale Cut score 
Utility Estimates 
Sens. Spec. OCCa 
BR = 15.0% BR = 25.0% 
PPP NPP PPP NPP 
FPP rule-in ≥ 75 .73 1.00 .93 1.00 .95 1.00 .92 
ASC rule-in ≥ 40 .63 .79 .75 .34 .92 .50 .86 
FPP rule-out ≤ 40 .78 1.00 .94 1.00 .96 1.00 .93 
ASC rule-out ≤ 25 .15 .98 .77 .51 .87 .67 .78 
FPP:ASC FACT > 1.80 .85 1.00 .96 1.00 .97 1.00 .95 
FPP:ASC MAL < 1.20 .88 .93 .91 .67 .98 .80 .96 
Note.  For utility estimates, Sens. = sensitivity; Spec. = specificity; OCC = overall correct classification; PPP = 
positive predictive power; NPP = negative predictive power. BR = base rate. For scales, FPP = Factitious 
Psychological Presentations; ASC = Antisocial. a OCC was calculated at the 25% base rate. 
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Beyond single scales, highly divergent patterns were observed on the I-SIP scales for the 
two simulation conditions. For the FACT group, average scores on the FPP were more than 
twice ASC (i.e., FPP ÷ ASC yielding a ratio of 2.27) with a strikingly opposite pattern for the 
MAL group (i.e., yielding a ratio of .75).  
As a more sophisticated approach to classifications, cut scores were established based on 
ratios of the FPP to ASC for both simulation groups. To identify factitious presentations, 
FPP:ASC > 1.80 achieved a very good sensitivity (.85)  and perfect specificity (1.00). For 
malingering presentations, FPP:ASC < 1.20 produced excellent classification, though slightly 
lower utility estimates (.88 and .93). As a practical consideration, the factitious cut score of 
FPP:ASC > 1.80 minimized classification issues related to measurement errors. The highest ratio 
for the FACT group was 1.58, substantially below the cut score. Similarly, the next lowest ratio 
for the MAL group was 2.05, much higher than the cut score. While pending cross-validation, 
the factitious FPP:ASC > 1.80 is the strongest clinical indicator to date for differentiating 
between feigning presentations. 
Research Question 5 
RQ5 asked whether the SIMS cut scores will be effective at differentiating the MAL 
simulation and FACT simulation conditions. Hypothesis 10 predicted the SIMS would not 
effectively distinguish between FACT and MAL simulation conditions, simply because the 
SIMS was not designed to distinguish between response styles (Rogers et al., 2005). Consistent 
with hypotheses, both MAL and FACT simulation groups produced mean elevations on all SIMS 
scales (Table 13). While the SIMS subscales can be informative to what types of symptoms or 
problems individuals are feigning, the total score represents an interpretive guide for potential 
malingering (Widows & Smith, 2004). The authors of the SIMS (2004) recommend a cut score 
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of 14 for the SIMS Total to indicate a heightened probability of feigning, which both the MAL 
(M = 36.43) and FACT (M = 30.00) groups clearly surpassed.  
Table 13 
 
Differences between MAL and FACT Simulation Groups Responses on the SIMS Total Scores 
and Revised Scales 
 
 FACT (n = 40) 
MAL 
(n = 40) F p d 
 M SD M SD 
SIMS Total 30.00 10.94 36.43 11.23 6.72 .01 -0.58 
P 4.90 3.69 6.90 3.48 8.21 .01 -0.56 
LI 3.38 3.04 4.93 2.91 5.42 .02 -0.51 
NI 6.38 3.40 8.08 3.27 5.19 .03 -0.51 
AF 9.80 1.90 9.08 2.12 2.60 .11 0.36 
AM 6.20 3.32 7.38 3.26 2.33 .13 -0.36 
RS 3.20 2.91 5.50 3.04 11.95   .001 -0.77 
SC 3.25 2.39 3.98 2.59 1.69 .20 -0.29 
Note. For SIMS scales: P = Psychosis; LI = Low Intelligence; NI = Neurologic Impairment; AF = Affective 
Disorders; AM = Amnestic Disorders; RS = Rare Symptoms; SC = Symptom Combinations. 
 
As a general trend, the MAL group scored modestly higher on the SIMS Total and most 
subscales except for AF. For the two detection-strategy scales (Rogers et al., 2014), only Rare 
Symptoms (RS) can be considered as a moderate effect size. It is interesting to note, however, 
that the FACT group averaged far below the established cut score for feigning (> 6). 
Using Rogers’ (2008) feigning classification, Cohen’s d values ≥ .75 are categorized as 
modest; only RS met this criterion. As discussed in more detail in the Discussion, it is possible 
those dissimulating for external gain are motivated to feign more severely and broadly than 
factitious simulators, and thus, generally had higher scores on SIMS scales. On more detailed 
analyses, five RS were higher in the MAL group taken from the Psychosis (3, 8, 69) and Low 
Intelligence (14, 21) subscales.  
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A crucial concern for this dissertation centers on the possible conflation with malingering 
and factitious response styles. To this point, SIMS cut scores (Total score and Rogers revised 
scales) did not effectively distinguish between MAL and FACT simulation groups. While the 
SIMS Total evidenced great sensitivity for a rule-in cut score of >14, its specificity was 
unacceptably low (.08; Table 14). Similar patterns were seen when examining a rule-out cut 
score of <10 for the SIMS Total. No participants in either simulation condition scored below 10, 
and thus, the specificity estimates were 0.00. Using Rogers et al. (2014) more conservative rule-
in cut score of >44 for the SIMS Total, utility estimates improved drastically for specificity (.93), 
but at a cost to reduced sensitivity (.28) 
Table 14 
Effectiveness of SIMS Cut Scores in Differentiating MAL and FACT Groups 
Cut Scores  Sens  Spec  OCCa  
PPP and NPP at different base rates 
BR = 15% BR = 25% 
PPP  NPP  PPP  NPP  
Likely FACT 
Total < 10 1.00 0.00 .25  .15  0.00  .25  0.00  
SC <2 .23 .85 .69 .21 .86 .33 .77 
Likely MAL 
Total > 14b  .98 .08 .30 .16 .94 .26 .90 
Total > 44c .28 .93 .76 .39 .88 .55 .79 
RS > 6  .40 .83 .72 .29 .89 .43 .81 
SC > 6 .18 .90 .72 .24 .86 .37 .77 
Note. For utility estimates, BR = base rate; Sens = sensitivity; Spec = specificity; OCC = overall; Co = correct 
classification; PPP = positive predictive power; NPP = negative predictive power.  Cut scores for Revised Scales 
were established based on Rogers et al. (2014) suggested cut scores. a OCC was calculated at the 25% base rate.  b 
Recommended cut score in SIMS manual. c Proposed cut score in Rogers et al. (2014). 
 
Two SIMS scales showed promise in differentiating between feigned response styles. The 
modified Total > 44 demonstrated excellent specificity but classifies only about quarter of 
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malingerers (sensitivity = .28). In contrast, RS is slightly more balanced (.83 and .40 
respectively). In addition, very low SC scores (< 2) are indicative of factitious presentations. 
Supplementary Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Supplementary Hypothesis 1 
This stated that simulators high in antisocial traits on the LSRP will evidence lower 
sensitivity and predictive power on the SIMS than those low in antisocial traits. The authors of 
the LSRP (Levenson et al., 1995) do not provide cut scores, but opt for a dimensional approach 
to psychopathy. Given the limited group sizes, a median split with an indeterminate group 
removed (i.e., + 1 SEM) was utilized to determine high vs. low antisocial characteristics for both 
MAL (SEM = 3.43) and FACT (SEM = 2.37) groups. For malingerers, LSRP Total scores with a 
M of 61.40, cut scores were < 71 for  “low” and > 78 for “high.” For the factitious group scores 
with a M of 49.88, cut scores < 46 were “low” and > 50 were “high”. Only 11 participants were 
removed from analyses due to scores falling within 1 SEM of the median split. 
Table 15 
Differences between Low vs. High Antisocial Traits on the SIMS 
Scale 
Low High 
F p d1 
M  SD M  SD 
SIMS Total 
FACT 27.44 7.90 34.75 12.53 4.23 .05 0.70 
MAL 33.60 9.98 41.22 10.13 5.45 .03 0.76 
d2 0.68  0.57     
SIMS RS 
FACT 2.83 2.75 3.94 3.19 1.17 .28 0.37 
MAL 4.85 2.87 6.39 3.05 3.43 .07 0.52 






F p d1 
M  SD M  SD 
SIMS SC 
FACT 2.56 1.76 4.19 3.19 3.52 .07 0.63 
MAL 3.35 2.76 5.00 2.72 2.57 .12 0.60 
d2 0.34  0.27     
Note. RS = Rare Symptoms; SC = Symptom Combinations. ns ranged from 16 – 18. d1 is the comparison of low 
FACT and high FACT groups and low MAL and high MAL groups. d2 is the comparison of FACT vs. MAL groups 
(low and high).  
 
Consistent with previous literature suggesting persons with antisocial characteristics are 
not especially adept at malingering (e.g., Impelen, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & à Campo, 2018), 
those high in antisocial traits proved to be less skilled at feigning on the SIMS. This finding was 
particularly evident with the SIMS Total, producing almost moderate (d = 0.70 for FACT) to 
moderate effect sizes (d = 0.76 for MAL; see Table 15). However, the detection strategy based 
scales demonstrated greater variability among groups. High antisocial malingerers chose to 
emphasize endorsement of rare symptoms, while their factitious counterparts elected to affirm 
unlikely symptom combinations.  
Contrary to predictions, individuals low in antisocial traits tended to be more effective at 
avoiding detection on the SIMS than those with high antisocial characteristics (Table 16). With 
the exception of the SIMS Total > 14 cut score, participants high in antisocial traits were 
generally better classified, with more balanced specificity and sensitivity. Using such a low cut 
score incorrectly classified factitious participants as malingering at unacceptably high rates 
(100% for high antisocial 89% for low antisocial). However, using Rogers et al.’s (2014) 
suggested >44 rule-in cut score, the amount of false positives reduced considerably for both high 




Effectiveness of SIMS Rule-in Cut Scores for Differentiating MAL and FACT Groups 
Cut Scores  Sens  Spec  OCCa  
PPP and NPP at different base rates 
BR = 15% BR = 25% 
PPP  NPP  PPP  NPP  
High Antisocial Traits 
Total > 14b  1.00 0.00 .25 .15 0.00 .25 0.00 
Total > 44c .39  .81 .71 .27 .88 .41 .80 
RS > 6  .50 .81 .73 .32 .90 .47 .83 
SC > 6 .28 .75 .63 .16 .86 .27 .76 
Low Antisocial Traits 
Total > 14b  1.00 .11 .33 .17 1.00 .27 1.00 
Total > 44c .06 1.00 .77 1.00 .86 1.00 .76 
RS > 6  .24 .83 .68 .20 .86 .32 .77 
SC > 6 .12 1.00 .78 1.00 .87 1.00 .77 
Note.  For utility estimates, BR = base rate; Sens = sensitivity; Spec = specificity; OCC = overall correct 
classification; PPP = positive predictive power; NPP = negative predictive power. Cut scores for Revised Scales 
were established based on Rogers et al. (2014) suggested cut score. a OCC was calculated at the 25% base rate. b 
Recommended cut score in SIMS manual. c Cut score proposed in Rogers et. al (2014). 
 
Supplementary Hypothesis 2 
Table 17 
Gender Differences on the I-SIP 
I-SIP Scale 
Female 
n = 43 
Male 
n = 37 F p d 
M SD M SD 
FPP 35.07 9.36 33.65 9.70 .44 .51 0.15 
ASC 35.37 14.13 37.27 18.26 .27 .60 0.12 
Filler 55.65 9.43 57.56 5.57 1.18 .28 0.25 
Note. FPP = Factitious Psychological Presentations; ASC = Antisocial Characteristics 
 
This stated that females will demonstrate higher scores on the FPP and males will 
evidence higher ASC scores. Both predictions were not realized. Despite presumably higher 
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needs for nurturance (Gnaulati & Heine, 2001; Williams, Giles, Edwards, Best, & Daws, 1977), 
FPP scores for female participants were very close to males. Similarly, males tend to score 
higher than females of psychopathic features (Falkenbach et al., 2017; Rogstad & Rogers, 2008), 
but observed differences were minimal (d = 0.12). On a positive note, these initial results suggest 






For decades, both scholars and practitioners (e.g., Eisendrath, 1994; Overholser, 1990) 
almost blithely assumed that motivation for feigning could be inferred from settings and 
circumstances. These assumptions led to the notion that persons feigning in clinical settings must 
be motivated to adopt a “sick role” and thus should be described as “factitious” (Feldman & 
Cunnien, 2008; Yates et al., 2018). Comparatively, individuals feigning in forensic settings are 
putatively motivated by external reasons (i.e., malingering), such as monetary reward or more 
lenient legal sentencing (Yates et al., 2018). As a result, a possibly false dichotomy between 
malingering and factitious disorders endures.  
While the underlying motivation continues to be the primary discriminator, Cunnien 
(1997) argued this simplification goes against much of what we know about the complexity of 
human behavior often involving multiple facets. The expectation that inclusion or exclusion of 
motivations can be used as the sole decisive factor ignores the reality of clinical practice. 
Cunnien (1997) posits that a patient may very well exaggerate or falsify symptoms for both 
external and internal gain concurrently. Overall, the conceptual underpinnings of malingering 
and factitious disorder are similar, leading to an obscured line of distinction between the two.  
This chapter discussing relevant factors regarding factitious psychological responses is 
organized into six sections. First, conceptual ambiguities of factitious presentations are explored. 
Second, ambiguities and other challenges regarding the measurement of factitious presentations 
are discussed. Third, the explanatory models for feigning, which led to the development of the I-
SIP are reviewed. Fourth, factitious assessments and psychometrics of feigning measures with 
factitious applications are critically examined, including the including the initial construct 
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validation of the I-SIP. The fifth section addresses FPP and its broad implications and 
preliminary recommendations for professional practice. In the sixth and final section, limitations, 
methodological considerations, and future directions are considered.   
Conceptual Ambiguities 
Asher’s (1951) establishment of Munchausen’s syndrome generated a much greater 
awareness that certain patients intentionally exaggerate or fabricate their physical symptoms, 
sometimes risking their own lives (e.g., unnecessary surgeries), for internal gains of medical 
attention. Munchausen’s syndrome was broadened and eventually sparked the modern 
conceptualization of factitious disorder as it is known today. Following Asher’s seminal paper, 
reports on patients with factitious disorders rose drastically, accounting for about 5% of patient 
encounters and have been documented in nearly every medical specialty (Kanaan & Wessely, 
2010).The rise in cases led to the realization of a diagnostic void, as clinicians were faced with 
feigned presentations that did not neatly fit into already established diagnostic categories. The 
resulting insight led to a growing problem of diagnostic challenges, particularly with increased 
ambiguity surrounding factitious presentations.  
As a result of diagnostic issues, a new category of factitious disorder was created to 
account for deliberately produced physical and psychological symptoms in DSM-III (APA, 
1980; Caselli et al., 2017). This was in effort to create a diagnostic category to encompass 
feigning for no other reason other than internal motivations (Hyler & Spitzer, 1978; Turner, 
1999). Throughout the years, several changes were implemented in DSM diagnostic criteria. As 
detailed in the Introduction, DSM-5 included extensive changes to diagnostic conceptualization. 
Arguably the most considerable shift involved the specification regarding external motivation in 
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DSM-5. The desire to play the sick role of a patient was removed, even though it was once a core 
requirement of the disorder (APA, 2013).  
Yates et al. (2018) suggested this modification resulted from a well-intentioned attempt 
to utilize more objective measures such as establishing false symptoms, rather than rely on the 
current understanding of the underlying motivation. The purpose to objectively identify 
symptoms is aligned with the increasing focus and stronger literature base for factitious disorders 
in medical settings.  Yet, this adjustment likely leads to the minimization of examining 
psychological factitious presentations where objective measures are rarely possible. Overall, 
shifts to move focus from considering underlying motivation in effort to increase objectivity 
largely ignores the complexity of factitious disorders and introduces problematic diagnostic 
issues.  
Inherent difficulties persist for clinicians to discern factitious patients’ motives for 
feigning. Guzman and Correll (2008) indicate formal diagnoses of factitious disorder only occur 
when patients are detected or readily admit to exaggerating or fabricating symptoms. Therefore, 
it is up to clinicians to rely on circumstantial evidence to first develop hypotheses and then 
confirm evidence of feigning due to the difficulty with ascertaining motive (Lawlor & 
Kirakowski, 2014). However, this approach contributes to considerable challenges for clinicians, 
as patients conceivably put forth effort to avoid detection, and clinicians are likely reluctant to 
make accusations without certainty. Cunnien (1997) suggests an increased recognition and 
understanding of factitious disorders may lead to increased knowledge of various motivations for 
feigning. 
As a further nosological complication, researchers have raised the question whether 
factitious disorders have ever qualified as a formal diagnosis. On this point, Rogers, Bagby and 
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Rector (1989) questioned the legitimacy of factitious disorder as a diagnosis due to the absence 
of clearly defined inclusion, exclusion, or outcome criteria. At the foundation, DSM diagnoses 
are composed of these three necessary elements (Rogers, 2001). For a mental disorder to be 
diagnostically valid, is imperative to distinguish between core characteristics and common 
features (inclusion criteria), determine how the disorder differs from related disorders (exclusion 
criteria), and establish the likely course for the disorder (outcome criteria).  
Determination of feigning based on the inclusion of external rewards alone poses a 
questionable and problematic distinction between a diagnosis of factitious disorder or a 
malingering V code. Therefore, as detailed in Velsor and Rogers (2019) and discussed in greater 
detail in the professional implications section of this chapter, factitious psychological 
presentations appear to be better conceptualized as a dimensional construct rather than a 
categorical diagnosis.  
Measurement Challenges 
Clinicians are faced with great disparities when comparing the availability of 
psychological literature on malingering and factitious disorders. Namely, a paucity of empirical 
research exists on factitious disorders despite documentation of patients intentionally falsifying 
or exaggerating symptoms in effort for internal gains (Ford, 2010). When searching for refereed 
articles on PsycINFO (retrieved May 27, 2020) using “forensic” and “factitious,” a mere 105 
articles were produced. However, when replacing “factitious” with “malingering,” the number of 
articles increases by over 1000%, with 1,261 peer-reviewed articles.  
Inherent difficulty in objectively measuring feigning motivated by internal reasons helps 
partially explains the dearth of research on factitious disorders (Feldman & Cunnien, 2008). This 
is in direct contrast to cases of malingering, where incentives for external reward appears to be 
 
78 
clearer, such as receiving monetary compensation in personal injury cases. In line with the lack 
of available objective measurements for factitious presentations, most of the literature on 
factitious disorders involves case studies or anecdotal reports from treatment providers (Yates et 
al., 2018). Therefore, a primary goal of the current dissertation aimed to address this gap in 
providing a standardized measure for factitious response styles.  
A cornerstone issue resulting from the lack of standardized assessment tools for factitious 
disorders involves the potential for misclassification of response styles and the introduction of 
bias. Within the realm of feigned mental disorders, Merten and Rogers (2017) postulated a 
factitious bias in clinical, treatment-based settings and a malingering bias in forensic contexts. It 
is suggested the likely presence of a malingering bias for forensic examinees results from the 
high number of cases in which individuals may possess strong incentives to fabricate or 
exaggerate symptoms within the legal system (Ford, 2010; Merten & Rogers, 2010). 
Furthermore, the lack of research on factitious presentations in combination with the supposed 
scarcity of factitious cases in forensic settings also contributes to these inferences (Rogers et al., 
1998; Young, 2015).  
With the large discrepancy of research available, it is difficult to ensure forensic 
practitioners are informed sufficiently to appropriately consider rival hypotheses to malingering 
(Rogers et al., 2005). Concerning this point, speciality guidelines instruct forensic psychologists 
to take an impartial and balanced approach to assessment, expecting that they “weigh all data, 
opinions, and rival hypotheses impartially” (APA, 2013, p. 9). Thus, a resulting primary concern 
involves feigned presentations being mistakenly classified as malingering because competing 
hypotheses were not actively considered. 
Given the high stakes nature of forensic evaluations, it is crucial that forensic 
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practitioners be as accurate as possible in classifying examinees. On this point, Rogers (2008, p. 
7) highlighted the dangers of “equating infrequency with inconsequentiality.” If factitious 
presentations are consistently overlooked in forensic assessments, many forensic examinees are 
presumably misclassified as malingering with impactful consequences. Forensic examinees who 
are feigning for external reasons (i.e., malingering) may obtain very different outcomes than 
those who are determined to be dissimulating for internal motives (i.e., factitious disorder). For 
instance, is possible that forensic practicioners may provide different recommendations for 
individuals who are feigning for dependency and emotional needs than those who are faking 
symptoms in effort for less punitive sentences.  
Revisiting the Explanatory Models Leading to the Development of the I-SIP 
Rogers (1990a, 1990b) explanatory models investigated the complex motivations to 
malinger. As a reminder, the explanatory models consist of pathogenic, adaptational, and 
criminological.  In 2019, Velsor and Rogers adopted a parallel approach in effort to examine 
explanatory models for factitious presentations with an added nurturance model. The conceptual 
framework represented the first systematic attempt to examine factitious motivations via 
explanatory models without a restrictive focus on psychodynamically-based theories (Rogers et 
al., 2005). Table 1 in the Introduction summarizes the key conceptual elements in the four FPP 
explanatory models. The next four paragraphs summarize each model separately, contrasting 
FPP with malingering. 
Pathogenic explanations posit that feigning represents individuals’ ineffectual attempts to 
control underlying psychopathology by consciously reproducing symptoms of mental disorders. 
This model predicts that the once falsely produced symptoms will eventually deteriorate to actual 
symptoms and features of the genuine, underlying disorder (Rogers 1990a, 1990b). When 
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applying to FPPs, key themes of an underlying genuine disorder include helplessness, severe 
fear, and an addictive quality of feigning (Feldman, 2004; Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014; Parker, 
1996; Yates et al., 2018). Pathogenic explanations appear to be the least prototypical of the 
models for malingering, with forensic experts agreeing that malingered symptoms rarely evolve 
into genuine mental disorders (Rogers et al., 1998). However, many salient characteristics from 
the factitious literature are a strong fit for pathogenic motivations to feign (see Table 1; Velsor & 
Rogers, 2019).  
The criminological model of feigning focuses motivations on antisocial drives and 
desires. In satisfying their own goals, feigners are often viewed as manipulative and lacking any 
positive regard for others (Rogers, 1990a). Criminological explanations are aligned closely with 
the DSM approach, which indicates malingering should be strongly suspected for uncooperative 
persons with Antisocial Personality Disorders (Berry & Nelson, 2010). While this explanatory 
model appears to be a good fit for motivations to malinger, there appears to be a lack of strong 
antisocial components with FPP motivations (Velsor & Rogers, 2019). Results from the current 
study underscore this perspective, as factitious participants exhibited 23% lower LSRP scores on 
average when compared to their malingering counterparts.  
The adaptational model explains motivations for feigning in terms of a constructive 
attempt to avoid disadvantageous consequences (Rogers, 1990a) in difficult, if not adverse, 
circumstances. Engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, feigners intentionally exaggerate or fabricate 
symptoms, seeking to achieve the best or least aversive outcome. Extending this model to 
factitious motivations, FPPs may serve both situational and adaptive functions in adversarial 
contexts (Feldman, 2004). For example, FPPs may function as a situational coping mechanism 
for patients as well as serve more long-term rewards, such as provide a sense of stable identity. 
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FPPs may also promote a sense of mastery and control over one’s circumstances (Feldman et al., 
2001; Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014).  
Finally, the nurturance model appears to be specific to factitious presentations, while the 
other three models share the same core features between malingering and FPPs. Nurturance 
explanations involve internal motivations for feigning to include a persistent desire for 
nurturance and sympathy combined with strong dependency needs (Feldman, 1996). In addition, 
the desire to assume the sick role is central as part of the overly invested relationships with 
treatment providers (Feldman, 2001; Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014; Rogers et al., 2010).  
The Inventory of Self and Interpersonal Problems (I-SIP; Rogers & Velsor, 2017) was 
developed based on a thorough review of factitious literature delineating conceptual elements of 
factitious disorder. The primary motivation was the need for an evaluation tool assessing for 
factitious psychological response styles. The next section examines factitious assessments and 
psychometrics of feigning measures with factitious applications, including the initial construct 
validity of the I-SIP.  
Factitious Assessments 
Detection Strategies for Feigning 
Detection strategies for malingered mental disorders have been systematically 
investigated for decades (see Rogers, 1997, 2008, 2018). This section is sharply focused on 
conceptual and empirical research that can be applied to differentiate the two main types of 
feigning, namely FPP and malingering. 
Several scholars deserve the lion share of credit for their contributions to the factitious 
literature. Though no measures currently exist to differentiate FPP from malingering, themes 
from the literature base offer insights into potential conceptual detection strategies used thus far. 
 
82 
Feldman (1996, 2001, 2004) argues that factitious disorder should be considered when patients 
strongly identify with the patient role and display a clear longing for nurturance from treatment 
providers and caretakers. While this may be difficult to objectively measure, Feldman suggests 
that consistent with unmet needs, factitious presentations promote the identification of health 
providers as the primary, if not sole, caregivers (Feldman, 2004). This behavior may be 
manifested in inappropriately strong attachments or unrealistic expectations from treatment 
providers. Additionally, Yates and colleagues suggest factitious patients appear to be strongly 
motivated to increase the intensity and breadth of mental health care (Yates & Feldman, 2016; 
Yates et al., 2018). Therefore, frequent self-admission to hospitals or reports of an unlikely 
symptom presentation may indicate an increased likelihood for factitious behavior (Yates et al., 
2018).  
Research involving the Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & 
Dickens, 1992) and the SIRS-2 (Rogers et al., 2010) represents some of the only empirical 
studies involving the assessment of factitious presentations. The original SIRS utilizes both 
“unlikely” (uncommon in genuine patients) and “amplified” (frequency and intensity uncommon 
in genuine patients) detection strategies.  
In addition to unlikely and amplified detection strategies, the SIRS-2 includes a screen 
for factitious disorders. A two-step approach is recommended for differentiating factitious 
presentations from malingering. The first step involves the establishment of the likelihood of 
feigned mental disorders in general. Second, individualized interview questions in conjunction 
with collateral information should be used to determine possible motive for feigning. Rogers et 
al. (2010) suggests a fairly straightforward approach to determining motivation via exploration 
of a cost-benefit analysis. This approach may include questions that parallel the MacArthur 
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decision model (Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey, & Fletcher, 1995), by examining an examinee’s 
cognitive decision-making processes. For example, practitioners may wish to inquire about an 
individual’s consequential thinking, such as what they think may happen in regard to specific 
choices regarding their presentation (e.g., feigning, genuine). Additionally, practitioners should 
consider how believable or convincing the examinee thought they were in their feigned 
presentation (Rogers et al., 2010; Velsor & Rogers, 2019). Through the exploration of questions 
like these, practitioners may formulate hypotheses about motivation.  
Previous Literature on Factitious Assessments 
SIRS and SIRS-2 
In an initial investigation, Rogers et al. (1994) examined differences in a small sample of 
forensic inpatients between examines with factitious psychological disorders (n = 9) and 
suspected malingerers (n = 25) utilizing the SIRS (Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992). Although 
not statistically significant, interesting patterns emerged on the SIRS primary scales between 
feigning groups. Compared with malingerers, factitious examinees scored higher on SIRS scales 
with amplified strategies and lower on those with unlikely detection strategies. As a possible 
explanation, factitious individuals may not be motivated to report very unlikely clinical 
characteristics or symptoms (Rogers et al., 1994). On the other hand, malingerers in high-stakes 
evaluations may be strongly motivated to prove their putatively extreme impairment. 
For this discussion, the nine factitious examinees were compared to 167 malingering 
simulators of the SIRS-2. The pattern for malingerers to endorse more unlikely symptoms than 
factitious examinees similarly observed (Rogers et al., 2010). Furthermore, factitious patients 
generally demonstrated fewer elevations on SIRS-2 primary scales, consistent with the notion of 




Further contributing to research on factitious presentations, Rogers and colleagues (2005) 
conducted the first simulation design involving differentiating factitious disorder from 
malingering. The goal was to distinguish two factitious simulation groups (dependent and 
demanding subtypes) from a malingering simulation group on the Personality Assessment 
Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007). Results indicated primary differences emerged on the Borderline 
Features scale (BOR), with both factitious groups producing above average scores. Rogers et al. 
(2005) suggest elevations on the Defensiveness Index (DEF) were the most useful for 
differentiating among malingering and factitious presentations. In particular, factitious 
simulators had significantly lower DEF scores than malingerers with a cut score of DEF < 1, 
producing moderate sensitivity (.59) and good specificity (.88). Overall, the authors conclude 
low DEF scores may indicate a heightened propensity for factitious presentations. These were 
the only utility estimates in the literature base to date comparing malingering and factitious 
response styles.  
Beyond direct comparison of malingering and factitious classification accuracy, Hawes 
and Boccaccini (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of PAI feigning indicators reviewing 26 
separate studies. In general, simulated malingerer’s Negative Impressive Management (NIM) 
scores were comparable to those found for factitious patients in Rogers et al. (2005). Though 
Hawes and Boccaccini (2009) utility estimates did not directly compare factitious and 
malingering response styles, cut scores of NIM ≥ 81 (.73 sensitivity and .83 specificity) provided 
the highest overall classification rates for identifying feigning. However, both dependent 
factitious (M NIM = 57.50) and demanding factitious (M NIM = 63.56) presentations were 




Beyond the of the PAI, Rogers and collegues (2005) investigated response style 
differences between malingerers and factitious participants on the SIMS. Results indicated two 
primary findings: (1) malingerers tended to score highest on the Neurological Impairment (NI) 
scale and (2) factitious participants scored higher on the Affective Disorders (AF) scale. These 
results are very comparable to those of the current dissertation, in which malingerers evidenced 
modestly higher scores on all SIMS scales than factitious participants with the singular exception 
of AF. Perhaps the nature of AF items (i.e., items related to depression, or more “typical” mood 
problems) motivate considerably more endorsement from factitious examinees. Many conceptual 
components central to FPPs involve affective, emotional needs such as heightened dependency 
(Feldman, 2004) and unmet needs for caring (Feldman 1996), which may be conceptually similar 
to depressive symtomology. As a further possible explanation, Parker (1996) found that 
diagnoses such as depressive disorders may contibute to and help maintain FPPs.  
Furthermore, Rogers et al. (2005) found the SIMS scales and total score did not 
differentiate between the factitious-psychological and malingering conditions. Similarly for the 
current study, though malingerers produced modestly higher scores on most scales, both groups 
produced consistent mean elevations on SIMS scales. For the detection strategy-based scales, RS 
performed the best at discriminating malingerers from factitious presentations, producing a 
moderate effect size (d = -0.77). In both Rogers et al. (2005) and the current study, malingerers 
tended to endorse rare symptoms on the SIMS at a higher frequency than their factitious 
counterparts. This shared finding suggests the external incentive of malingering possibly 
motivates a more severe and broad approach to feigning. In particular, malingers scored 
consistently higher on specific items from the Psychosis (3, 8, 69) and Low Intelligence (14, 21) 
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subscales in the current study. Therefore, individuals choosing to feign cognitive/intellectual 
impairment and symptoms of thought disorder may have an increased likelihood for malingered 
presentations.  
For utility estimates, SIMS cut scores (Total score and Rogers revised scales) did not 
effectively distinguish between MAL and FACT simulation groups. However, two SIMS scales 
showed modest utility in differentiating between feigned response styles. The modified Total > 
44 (proposed by Rogers et al., 2014) evidenced excellent specificity when compared with the 
Total > 14 cut score suggested in the manual (.93 vs. .08, respectively). However, there is a 
drastic cost to sensitivity, as only 28% of malingerers are correctly classified with the modified 
Total (compared with 98% for Total > 14).  For classifying factitious presentations, low SC 
scores (< 2) appear to be moderately effective. In fact, factitious simulators averaged far below 
the suggested cut score (> 6) for both detection-strategy based scales (RS and SC). As the current 
dissertation represents the first investigation of the effectiveness of SIMS cut scores in 
differentiating malingering and factitious response styles, examination of reproducibility is 
warranted. 
Classification Accuracy of the I-SIP 
As a very positive finding, the I-SIP cut scores (i.e., FPP and ASC rule-in and rule-out 
cut scores and FPP:ASC ratio scores) generally produced much stronger utility estimates, when 
compared past simulation research (i.e., Rogers et al., 2005). In particular, the FPP:ASC ratio 
scores performed exceptionally well. In fact, sensitivity estimates of the ratio scores were nearly 
twice that of the DEF < 1 cut score proposed by Rogers and colleagues (2005). Rather than 
single-scale differences, ratios may offer a more sophisticated measure of a particular construct 
of interest (Martin, Hoffman, & Donders (2003). In this case, FPP:ASC  ratio scores provide a 
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method of detection strategy examining the proportion of factitious items to antisocial items on 
the I-SIP. The ability to correctly classify response styles is improved, as the cut scores go in the 
opposite direction (i.e., MAL < 1.20; FACT > 1.80).  
As stated in the Results, the FPP generally produced better classification accuracy than 
the ASC. FPP rule-in and rule-out cut scores evidenced perfect specificity (1.00) and good 
sensitivities (.73 and .78, respectively), much better than ASC utility estimates. Of importance, 
malingering should never be equated with antisocial characteristics. The DSM approach 
indicates malingering should be strongly suspected if a person has Antisocial Personality 
Disorder (APD; Berry & Nelson, 2010). However, as Rogers (2018) addressed, reliance on 
common rather than distinguishing characteristics is bound to fail. Simply because many 
antisocial persons may malinger does not prove the converse to be true. As an extreme analogy, 
most malingerers are ambulatory, but we would never conclude that all ambulatory persons are 
malingerers. Thus, antisocial characteristics are not expected to be an effective discriminator.  
While cross-validation is warranted, the FPP:ASC is the strongest clinical indicator to 
date for differentiating between factitious presentations from malingering. FACT participants’ 
average ratio scores (2.27) were over 3 times that of their malingering counterparts (.75) 
producing an extremely large effect size (d = 2.91). In particular, the proportion of items with 
antisocial themes such as a disregard for others and a selfish nature, compared with FPP items 
involving a desire for strong relationships with providers were particularly strong differentiators. 
Distinguishing examples from the ASC include, “I don’t feel bad for born losers” and 
“When it comes to the criminal justice system, my main goal is to not get caught.” In contrast, 
FPP items with the largest differences consist of, “I have pretended to be in crisis just to get lots 
of professional attention” and “I admire my doctor more than is proper.” Further validation and 
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replication in future research would be valuable for exploring particular I-SIP items that may be 
especially useful in differentiating response styles.  
Inherent challenges persist when asking practitioners to think about proportions rather 
than a seemingly more definitive cut score. This requires an assessment tool to include items or 
scales intended to specifically address different response styles, rather than a more simple 
approach of measuring a unitary construct. However, considering ratio scores may represent 
advancement to the current approach to assessment of response styles. Taken together, according 
to the current preliminary data, ratio scores appear to be the most effective approach to 
distinguishing between response styles thus far.  
Construct Validity of the I-SIP 
Chronbach and Meehl (1955) determined three central steps to construct validity. First, 
theoretical concepts and their proposed interrelations must be established. Second, approaches to 
measure the hypothesized relationships among constructs are developed (i.e., via experimental 
design). Finally, the predicted relationships among constructs and their observable expression 
must be empirically tested. For the current dissertation, the first and second steps are detailed in 
the Introduction and Method sections, respectively. Therefore, the investigation of construct 
validity for the newly developed I-SIP was a primary goal (i.e., third step) with the establishment 
of scale homogeneity as the immediate goal. 
Scale Homogeneity  
Clark and Watson (1995) delineate the importance of strong internal consistencies and 
acceptable inter-item correlations for the establishment of scale homogeneity. Reassuringly, both 
the FPP and ASC produced impressive alphas. In particular, the FPP produced an excellent alpha 
of .86, clearly surpassing Nunnally’s (1967) classification of alphas > .80 or greater as a general 
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criterion and close to alphas > .90 for clinical settings. Furthermore, inter-item correlations for 
the FPP were in the recommended range, suggestive that content of the items are contributing to 
unique variance within factitious presentations. For the ASC, alpha coefficient (.95) was even 
more remarkable. However, the relationships among items were at the high end of the 
recommended range at .50. This may suggest that ASC item content is verging on the edge of 
redundancy (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2005). Taken together, the data regarding the scale 
homogeneity of the FPP and ASC are highly positive, particularly for the initial exploration of 
the I-SIP’s reliability.  
Interestingly, the Filler scale produced a moderate alpha (.76), which was unexpected 
because its items were included to disguise the true purpose of the I-SIP and thus, reduce face-
validity (Kumar, Lebo, & Gallagher, 1991). As mentioned in the Results, however, the items 
may not function as intended (i.e., items without a particular response pattern). Instead, 
participants provided a majority of affirmative responses to Filler items. This pattern was seen 
for both honest and simulated conditions, but was especially evident among factitious simulators 
(i.e., averaging over 72% affirmative responses on the Filler scale). An examination at the item-
level was informative, as a few items in particular appeared to be large contributors to similar 
response patterns among participants. Under simulated conditions, virtually all factitious 
participants affirmed the items, such as (a)“Loyalty is something I strongly value among friends 
and family” (92.5%) and (b) “I am not bothered by lengthy forms when applying for something 
important” (95.7%). Perhaps participants assuming the role of individuals desperately desiring 
care and attention from others wanted to project an image of overly virtuous persons.  
The unexpectedly high reliability of the Filler scale suggests item content would require 
revision if the scale were to function as intended. An effective approach may be to make the item 
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content more neutral, thus reducing socially desirability. Kestembaum and Hammersla (1976) 
recommended that different choices be matched on social desirability to diminish impression 
management.  
Despite strong scale overall homogeneity, the FPP subscales (i.e., Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Relationship with Providers, Treatment Needs, and Patient Role) had marginal to poor alpha 
coefficients. The most likely explanation centers on the lack of empirical data regarding these 
formulations, which are largely based on a scattering of case studies. 
It is possible that the low number of items on the subscales contribute to the lack of 
strong reliability estimates, as the subscales range anywhere from 3 to 8 items. Harvey, Billings, 
and Nilan (1985) suggest that at least 4 items per scale are needed to effectively test the 
homogeneity of items within each latent construct. Conversely, other scholars have indicated 
adequate scale reliability can be achieved with as few as three items (Hinkin, 1995). 
Interestingly, the FPP subscale with the highest number of items produced the lowest alpha 
(Treatment Needs α = .45), while the subscale with the fewest items achieved the strongest alpha 
(Patient Role α = .68).  
Due to the unacceptable alpha, the Treatment Needs subscale was dropped. Streiner 
(2003) posited unacceptable alphas that result in greater than 50% non-systemic error have little 
value in scale interpretation. The Treatment Needs subscale covers the broadest scope of FPP. 
Largely derived from pathogenic explanations, patients with FPPs appear to be strongly 
motivated to increase the intensity and breadth of mental health care (Yates et al., 2018). 
However, this construct can include vastly different FPP elements such as feelings of being 
trapped or helpless (Feldman, 2004), fearing the loss and support of loved ones or treatment 
providers (Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014), or being especially demanding of treatment and care 
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(Yates et al., 2018). These various elements of pathogenic explanations provide valuable insight 
for how FPPs are maintained over time (Velsor & Rogers, 2019), but also exemplify the 
comparative broad scope of the Treatment Needs subscale. Therefore, it is possible the 
variability of conceptual elements, and resulting item content of the subscale, partially help 
explain the lack of strong subscale homogeneity.  
The three remaining subscales yielded marginal alphas. While subscales can be 
particularly informative for what elements of a disorder is being reported (Hyer, Harkey, 
Harrison, 1986), their interpretations should be considered more tentative and hypothesis-
generating. The overarching FPP scale clearly wins out when comparing scale homogeneity to 
that of its subscales. Therefore, the overall FPP scale is recommended for differentiating between 
response styles.  
Convergent Validity 
Campbell and Fiske (1959) provided the foundation for approaches to establish construct 
validity, primarily through the examination of convergent and discriminant validity. For 
convergent validity, variables should “correlate higher with an independent effort to measure the 
same trait than with measures designed to get at different traits” (p 83). As noted in the Results, 
the convergent correlates between construct validity measures were largely disappointing. 
Campell and Fiske (1959) propose the examination of alternative possibilities if inadequate 
correlations are found, including the possibility that one method is inadequate for measuring the 
trait. Importantly, the scholars indicate the failure to demonstrate convergence may lead to 
conceptual developments, rather than to the abandonment of a test. The next few paragraphs 




Unexpectedly low convergent correlates may have resulted from problems with selection 
of construct validity measures (i.e., WAI and IOS). A central element of factitious presentations 
involves patients desiring, even demanding, higher levels of care (Yates et al., 2019). Motivated 
by a longing for nurturance from treatment providers and caretakers, these unmet psychological 
needs are fulfilled by exaggerating or fabricating symptoms (Velsor & Rogers, 2019). The WAI 
is intended to assess the alliance between a patient and treatment staff, including agreement on 
tasks and goals of therapy and the development of an effective bond (Horvath, 1992). If 
individuals with FPPs truly feel they need or deserve more intensive treatment, would they be 
likely to rate agreement on tasks and goals highly? Or, alternatively, would they perhaps be 
inclined to disagree on these facets in effort to express their dissatisfaction with their care?  
The current results indicate factitious simulators are at least projecting a positive image 
of the therapeutic relationship despite the conceptual argument that factitious individuals may be 
unhappy with the level of care they are receiving (Feldman, 1996, 2004). Factitious simulators 
generally evidenced large increases on their perceptions of the therapeutic alliance, with nearly 
30% average increases on the WAI when compared with their honest responses. This was 
especially prevalent on the Goal subscale, suggestive that factitious simulators generally reported 
a high level of agreement with providers in regard to the goals of treatment. Perhaps the 
unrealistic and possibly romanticized view of mental health professionals (Rogers et al., 2010; 
Velsor & Rogers, 2019) helps partially explain high ratings of the working alliance, regardless of 
patients’ perceptions of needs for care being met.  
Upon reflection, it is possible the IOS was not the best match for convergent validity due 
the almost exclusive focus on the nurturance model at the expense of other explanatory models. 
The IOS focuses on four dimensions assumed to underlie the affiliation motivation, including the 
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need for empathy, compassion, and attention from others (Hill, 1987). The measure largely 
corresponds with nurturance conceptual elements such as the dependency and desire for intense 
interpersonal relationships with providers (Feldman, 2004) and family/friends (Catalina et al., 
2008). However, other measures of interpersonal affiliation considered for the current study 
(e.g., Need for Affiliation Scale,(Jackson, 1984) appear to have an even narrower focus.  
Therefore, difficulty in obtaining near-neighbor measures for many of the FPP conceptual 
elements may help partially explain disappointing convergent correlates. Some components 
appear to be so unique to FPPs, that they are not well represented in already established 
measures. For example, the literature supports FPPs serving an adaptational role, allowing 
patients to meet psychological needs at the price of dependency. Similarly, Lawlor and 
Kirakowski (2014) found evidence for FPPs serving the function of a coping mechanism, by 
providing a method of avoidance and control. While the I-SIP encompasses these adaptational 
conceptual elements, there are virtually no psychometric tools to make comparisons with or 
provide construct validity of these components.  
The typical range of scores for clinical populations on the convergent measures was 
explored as a possible explanation for the unexpectedly low correlates.  However, the current 
study generally produced comparable averages to that of previous literature. For instance, 
inpatients’ typical ratings of the therapeutic alliance were very similar to the current study, with 
less than a 3% difference (Moreno et al., 2018). Similarly, literature on the IOS used in clinical 
populations indicates comparable averages to current data (Hill, 1987). In summary, though 
various approaches were investigated for potential impact on disparate findings of convergent 
validity, no solid explanations were established.  
In contrast to the WAI and IOS, the ASC produced exceptionally strong convergent 
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correlates with the LSRP. Overall, this provides substantial evidence that the ASC is a good 
measure of antisocial characteristics. In particular, the LSRP Primary subscale produced the 
strongest relationships with the ASC. That is, psychopathic emotional features, such as 
manipulativeness and superficial charm (i.e., primary psychopathy) appear to be especially well 
represented on the ASC of the I-SIP. Differences in levels of antisocial traits across simulation 
conditions are further examined in the section detailing the impact of the simulation condition on 
I-SIP responses. 
Discriminant Validity  
As a parallel to convergent validity, discriminant validity represents a core component of 
construct validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) that is often de-emphasized in test development. 
This section addresses discriminant validity more generally within the multi-trait, multi-method 
framework. The next section utilizes a much more focused simulation design for a very specific 
application of discriminant validity in differentiating FPP from malingering.  
Consistent with antisocial traits resulting in a lack of empathy or interest in genuine 
interpersonal relationships with others (Igoumenou et al., 2017), higher levels of antisocial traits 
were expected to contribute to worse perceptions of the working relationship with providers (i.e., 
negative correlations between the WAI and antisocial characteristics). Malingerers have been 
reported to be especially uncooperative with providers in effort to avoid detection (Millis, 2008). 
On the contrary, factitious individuals are generally over-involved in the treatment process and 
demonstrate a higher need for nurturance from health care professionals (Feldman, 1996, 2004; 
Rogers et al., 2010). As expected, the ASC demonstrated significant negative relationships with 
the WAI for malingerers. A similar, but weaker relationship was seen for participants asked to 
simulate a factitious response style. The LSRP and WAI Total had significant negative 
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relationships for all participants when responding honestly and simulating, lending additional 
evidence to the link between antisocial characteristics and poorer relationships with treatment 
providers.  
As further evidence, malingering simulators exhibited negative relationships with the 
FPP and WAI Bond subscale. While these scales had positive relationships for factitious 
simulators, malingerers clearly did not endorse as strong of bonds or connections with treatment 
professionals. Taken together, these results provide support to the hypothesis that individuals 
with higher antisocial traits are less vested in and have poorer perceptions of their relationships 
with treatment providers than those feigning for internal reasons, such as desire for nurturance 
and attention from medical professionals (Feldman, 1996; Rogers et al., 2010).  
FPP relationships with the LSRP were hypothesized to be negative; however, correlations 
were much more variable than anticipated. Negative relationships were expected, as there 
generally appears to be an absence of criminological or antisocial motivations in factitious 
presentations (Velsor & Rogers, 2019). While the relationship between FPP and LSRP decreased 
as anticipated for factitious participants across conditions, the opposite pattern was observed for 
malingerers. As previously discussed, it is plausible that malingerers were motivated to feign 
more broadly in effort to appear completely disabled for financial gain.  
Discriminant Validity on the I-SIP between FPP and Malingering 
Response-style literature has utilized simulation designs to assess for discriminant 
validity for over 50 years (e.g., Haynes, 1978; Rogers, Gillis, Dickens, & Bagby, 1991; Rogers et 
al., 2013). Within this context, Lowe and Ryan‐Wenger (1992) describe how methods other than 
correlations, such as the analysis of variance (ANOVA), can provide support for discriminant 
validity. The authors indicate different methods are undeniably assessing distinct constructs 
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when clear differences in response patterns between groups are shown. Therefore, as a more 
targeted approach to discriminant validity, differences in responses between simulation 
conditions (i.e., FACT and MAL) were examined. 
As a first step, differences in responses between FACT and MAL participants when 
answering honestly were investigated. Some previous studies have combined genuine conditions 
(e.g., Kasten, Freund, & Staufenbiel, 2020; Weiss et al., 2013), whereas others have not (e.g., 
Rogers, Payne, Correa, Gillard, & Ross, 2009; Rogers, Robinson & Henry, 2017). However, it 
was believed to be more rigorous to keep with original data analytic plan, as combining groups 
may obscure some salient differences. Keeping the groups separate is a more stringent approach 
to ensure the results for simulated conditions are interpreted appropriately. For example, if there 
happened to be substantial differences among participants on the IOS when answering honestly, 
it would be difficult to make comparisons on this scale between simulated conditions. Thus, 
implications for factitious presentations would have to be interpreted cautiously.  
Despite quasi-random assignment, several small differences between groups emerged. 
Most notably, the MAL group evidenced higher levels of antisocial characteristics as measured 
by the ASC and LSRP. Rather than trying to manage negative impressions, the malingering 
group appeared to emphasize their willingness to deceive others. They evidenced substantially 
higher LSRP total scores in the malingering simulation condition (M = 74.42) than is typical for 
offender samples (M = 55.84; Poythress et al., 2010). To this end, malingerers increased their 
reporting of antisocial traits by 21.2% on the LSRP and by 25.1% on the ASC across conditions 
in the current study. This is generally in contrast to previous literature suggesting most 
malingerers try to suppress antisocial characteristics (e.g., Gardner, & Boccaccini, 2017; Hill, 
2013; Rogers & Cruise, 1998). For example, studies examining the impact of feigning disability 
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on multiscale inventories (e.g., PAI, MMPI-2), show individuals are typically motivated to 
minimize the perception of traits like intentional deceit and the exploitation of others (Arbisi, 
Ben-Porath, & McNulty, 2006; Rogers, Gillard, Wooley, & Rosee, 2012). Furthering this point, 
Gardner and Boccaccini (2017) found that as sexually violent offenders increased symptom 
exaggeration on the PAI (i.e., NIM), they suppressed the PAI Antisocial Features (ANT) 
subscale. In general, individuals attempting to overstate pathology generally had lower ANT 
scores, lessening the overall validity of the self-report measure  (Gardner & Boccaccini, 2017).   
However, other research has demonstrated opposite findings, such that malingerers may 
show heightened antisocial characteristics. Heinze and Vess (2005) found forensic examinees 
that had higher F and Fp scores on the MMPI-2 tended score higher on the PCL-R (i.e., 
exhibited higher antisocial traits). Similarly, Kucharski and Duncan (2006) found individuals 
were more likely to get classified as malingering on multiscale inventories (e.g., PAI and MMPI-
2) and structured interviews (e.g., SIRS) when they demonstrated stronger antisocial 
characteristics.  
Impressive differences with very large effect size sizes were achieved for all construct 
validity measures under simulated conditions. For the FPP, it appears that while all conceptual 
elements performed well at discriminating MAL and FACT groups, over-investment in 
relationships with treatment professionals was a particularly strong differentiator (Feldman, 
2004; Rogers et al., 2010). Interpersonally, factitious patients’ romanticized perceptions of 
treatment providers may be generalized to a sense of special treatment for a special patient, thus 
inevitably reinforcing the nurturance model.  
Core differences between factitious presentations and malingering may involve 
individuals’ thoughts, emotionality, and behaviors towards treatment providers (Velsor & 
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Rogers, 2019). Although malingerers may exhibit some superficial positive emotions, 
particularly at the beginning of treatment, this is not likely to sustain. Malingerers tend to be 
primarily concerned with being convincing in their display of false symptoms, while monitoring 
professionals’ reactions for perceived believability. Conversely, factitious patients are likely to 
focus greatly on maintaining a positive self-image to ensure the continuation of care and 
dependency on providers (Feldman, 2004; Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014). These strong emotions 
towards treatment providers are likely to be easily recognized and strengthened by their 
behaviors and communication (Velsor & Rogers, 2019).  
As further support for nurturance explanations of FPP, factitious simulators demonstrated 
IOS Emotional Support subscale scores nearly twice that of their malingering counterparts. This 
finding clearly indicates dramatically higher needs for compassion, concern, and empathy from 
others. These results provide further evidence that factious presentations are at least partially 
motivated by intense dependency needs (Cunnien, 1997) and difficulty getting needs met in 
social relationships (Rogers et al., 2005).  
Moreover, measures of antisocial characteristics (i.e., ASC, LSRP) clearly differentiated 
between malingering and factitious response styles, with malingerers choosing to increase scores 
dramatically across conditions. While some researchers have found FPPs to be motivated by 
pathological lying (Yates et al., 2018) or gratification from deceiving others (Ford, 2010), 
criminological perspectives clearly align better with malingering (Velsor & Rogers, 2019). As 
supported in the current results, prototypical analyses (Rogers et al., 1994, 1998) found 
prominent antisocial motivations and psychopathic characteristics in forensic and non-forensic 
settings for malingering. Interestingly, Rogers and colleagues (1998) found malingered mental 
disorders produced lower prototypical ratings than feigned medical disorders (d = 0.36). 
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Secondary psychopathy traits, such as impulsivity and lack of long terms goals, served as a 
particularly strong discriminator (d = -1.26), with malingerers reporting over 41% more 
psychopathic lifestyle characteristics than factitious participants.  
Implications for Professional Practice 
The limited available research on factitious disorders has primarily conceptualized FPPs 
as a categorical diagnosis. However, factitious presentations may be more appropriately 
considered a dimensional construct. Rogers, Bagby, and Vincent (1994, p. 91) describe factitious 
disorders as a “conundrum for forensic experts.” The significant diversity in clinical 
presentations and problematic DSM-IV diagnostic criteria involving the “sick role” as the 
exclusive motivation were central arguments against the legitimacy of factitious disorder as a 
formal diagnosis. Extensive documentation of clinician encounters provides confirmation of the 
remarkable complexity and heterogeneity of factitious presentations (Yates & Feldman, 2016; 
Yates et al., 2018). Furthermore, and as stated previously, factitious disorder appears to lack core 
requirements of a diagnosis (i.e., formal and clear inclusion, exclusion, and outcome criteria; 
Rogers et al., 2012).  
Moreover, changes to DSM-5 diagnostic criteria further complicates conceptual 
understanding of factitious presentations. One of the most notable changes involved removing 
the subtypes (i.e., physical and psychological). DSM-5 also removed the once core criteria of 
motivated by the “sick role,” and instead, indicated feigning must be present “even in the 
absence of obvious external rewards” (APA, 2013a, p. 325). While these changes were aligned 
efforts to shift away from understanding the underlying motive in favor of more objective 
measures, it greatly diminishes the focus on psychological presentations (Velsor & Rogers, 
2019). In particular, ignoring the underlying motivation neglects the complexity of factitious 
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presentations and undermines the importance of the core distinguishing factor from other 
response styles, namely malingering.   
Thus, as argued in Velsor and Rogers (2019), the current study provides indirect evidence 
that FPPs can be considered a psychosocial condition that varies over time and circumstances, 
rather than a formal diagnosis. Factitious presentations would then be placed accordingly in 
V62.89, “other problem related to psychosocial circumstances,” much like a malingering V code 
that “may be a focus of clinical attention” (APA, 2015, p. 725). Importantly, considering 
factitious presentations as a dimensional construct allows for direct comparisons of response 
styles of FPPs and malingering. Previous research has also provided support to the notion of 
factitious presentations as a response style tied to situational factors. For example, Catalina et al. 
(2008) found factitious patients’ symptoms mysteriously disappeared when admitted to the 
hospital, but symptoms reappeared and increased when practitioners discussed discharge with the 
patients.  
Though the current results are preliminary, factitious presentations are clearly related to 
situational facets, as demonstrated via differences in honest vs. simulated responses on the I-SIP. 
Factitious participants chose to increase their responses on the FPP scale and subscales by over 
100% consistently from honest to simulated conditions, providing evidence of circumstantial 
motivators within the simulation scenario. In particular, factitious simulators were especially 
motivated to feign strong needs for intense relationships with treatment providers, averaging a 
132.9% increase from their honest responses.  
A cornerstone issue resulting from conceptual ambiguity and general lack of 
understanding of factitious disorders involves the potential for misclassification of response 
styles (Cunnien, 1997; Velsor & Rogers, 2019). Practitioners in clinical, and especially forensic 
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settings, should not ignore factitious presentations as a rival hypothesis in making determinations 
of malingering. 
The lack of effectiveness of SIMS cut scores in distinguishing response styles in the 
current study underscores this problem of potential misclassification. It is important to note that 
the SIMS assesses for feigned mental disorders, but was not designed to distinguish between 
exaggerated response styles (Rogers et al., 2005). Predictably, the SIMS generally performed 
very poorly at discriminating between factitious and malingered response styles, with both 
groups producing mean elevations on all SIMS scales. Utilizing the authors’ suggested SIMS 
total > 14 cut score, virtually all factitious examinees were misclassified as malingering (92%). 
Classification accuracy improved drastically when using Rogers’ Modified Total > 44, but at a 
substantial cost to sensitivity. Taken together, these results highlight the concern of possible 
conflation with malingered and factitious response styles. Thus, practitioners should exercise 
caution when assessing for feigned presentations and increase awareness and consideration of the 
potential for alternative response styles. 
Current results provide initial insight for how the I-SIP may be best used in clinical 
practice. Because data have not been cross-validated, the I-SIP is most appropriately used as a 
screen at the current time. Screening measures have the potential to provide a time-efficient 
preliminary assessment (Rogers et al., 2014).  
In particular, the FPP:ASC ratio scores appear to be especially useful for differentiating 
malingered from factitious presentations. Utilizing the cut scores proposed in Table 12 (> 1.80 
for FACT; < 1.20 for MAL), the best available utility estimates were achieved with excellent 
specificity and good sensitivity for both malingerers (.93 and .88, respectively) and factitious 
(1.00 and .85, respectively) examinees. Therefore, clinicians may wish to administer the I-SIP 
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and calculate the FPP:ASC to clarify questions of potential dissimulation and aid with 
consideration of different response styles.   
On an item-level examination at the, several I-SIP items were especially good at 
discriminating between factitious and malingering presentations (ds > 2.50). On the FPP, 
factitious examinees affirmed two items at much higher rates: “I admire my doctor more than is 
really proper” (d = 2.79) and “I see counselors as true care-givers” (d = 3.28). These items from 
the Relationships with Provider subscale provide empirical evidence consistent with nurturance 
explanations of FPPs (Feldman, 1996, 2004; Lawlor & Kirakowski, 2014; Rogers et al., 2010).  
Conversely, several ASC items were frequently reported in the MAL conditions. 
Examples include, “I use anger as a means to get what I want out of weaker persons” (d = 2.75) 
and, “When it comes to the criminal justice system, my main goal is to not get caught” (d = 
3.12). On a practical basis, clinical practitioners may want to modify the format of these 
questions and intersperse them with other relevant clinical inquiries. 
Methodological Limitations 
Valuable to both researchers and practitioners, the current study provided the first 
systematic assessment of factitious psychological presentations as a dimensional construct. 
However, the current dissertation had some methodological limitations that could be largely 
addressed by future research.  
Because of its originality, the study lacked a body of past research on which to build, thus 
resulting in several challenges. One primary challenge involved selection of relevant construct-
validity measures for the I-SIP. With no previous research, the primary basis of the I-SIP 




Cross-validation and extension of this research is definitely warranted. It would be 
greatly beneficial if future research were conducted on the I-SIP’s utility in other general clinical 
settings (e.g., outpatient), and especially, forensic settings. In particular, comparing results to 
those of a true malingering group or true factitious group (i.e., known groups comparison) would 
be ideal. Rogers (2018) indicates known-groups designs are more rigorous, and in general, apply 
more stringent criteria than partial criterion designs. However, with the current general lack of 
insight into factitious presentations and supposed rarity of cases, obtaining a known factitious 
group may prove challenging. Nonetheless, simulation designs have the advantage of internal 
validity, but external validity from known-group comparisons would certainly complement them.  
Simulation research on response styles underscores important methodological concerns 
(Rogers, 2018). Providing participants with an external, albeit nominal incentive for their 
engaged participation is important to ensure motivation for successful simulation (Rogers, 2018). 
Much like concerns raised by Rogers and colleagues (2005), factitious participants in the current 
study were given monetary compensation, more analogous to malingering (i.e., external 
incentive), because an internal incentive (e.g. special attention by a therapist) is obviously not 
feasible. However, it is likely many genuine factitious patients actually receive some external 
benefits in addition to their primary internal motivations (e.g., decreased responsibilities at work 
or home; Rogers et al., 2005). As Cunnien (1997) argues, external gains should not, by 
themselves, exclude the presence of factitious motivations.  
The factitious simulation instructions were adapted from the scenarios used in Rogers et 
al. (2005) and are largely based on conceptual FPP elements delineated in Velsor and Rogers 
(2019). While the instructions for the simulation conditions appear to be clear, comprehensive, 
and motivating (Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2009), it was difficult to know what 
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information to include in the FACT simulation scenario as only the second study in this area. 
Being primarily based on one conceptual article, it is difficult to ensure all appropriate elements 
were included to motivate individuals to assume a factitious role. In effort to match the moderate 
level of insight of factitious patients (Rogers et al., 2005), simulation instructions avoided 
diagnostic jargon or clinical interpretations. Additional research with factitious simulation 
designs may better capture the vast “intrapsychic dynamics” involved with factitious 
presentations (Rogers et al., 2005, p. 33).  
Future Directions 
The continuing conceptual and diagnostic ambiguities of factitious presentations clearly 
deserves more scholarly attention. Challenges in the assessment of factitious disorder continue, 
in combination with DSM-5 shifts away from understanding the underlying motivation in favor 
of more objective measures (Yates et al., 2018). While this goal for increased objectivity is 
commendable, it certainly contributes to a lack of focus on psychological presentations.  
As demonstrated considerably throughout this dissertation, there may be far-reaching, 
real-world implications if practitioners are not well prepared to actively consider rival 
hypotheses, such as misclassification of response styles (Rogers et al., 2005; Velsor & Rogers, 
2019). Thus, additional research efforts should be placed on the differentiation of malingered and 
factitious presentations. To illustrate, a hypothetical scenario study in which practitioners are 
given ambiguous information about patients with factitious and malingered presentations and 
asked for their conclusions may be especially illuminating. Studies such as these would provide 
excellent insight into the general awareness and consensus about factious response styles among 
providers. Moreover, future research may wish to examine biases in determining response styles 
and common misconceptions of factitious presentations among treatment providers. This 
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information can be then used to inform the larger community of mental health practitioners, so 
professionals may be better able to consider alternate hypotheses to malingering.  
The feasibility of the DSM-IV and DSM-5 nosological models of factitious disorders 
could be tested directly. Participants would include health care providers, such as physicians, 
who are expected to encounter patients with factitious disorders. Scenarios could be taken from 
existing case studies with confirmed outcomes. With DSM-IV inclusion criteria, the adoption of 
a sick role and other characteristics would be featured. For the DSM-5, providers would be 
provided with unexpected, likely contradictory “objective” findings. In both cases, their 
diagnostic conclusions would be evaluated against the confirmed outcomes. Because of its 
claimed objectivity, DSM-5 might appear to be obviously superior. On reflection, however, 
health care providers are faced with challenging alternatives: laboratory mistakes, accidental 
errors (e.g., ingesting the wrong dosage or medication), factitious disorder by proxy, and even 
the possibility of malingering. 
Refinement and improvements to the I-SIP represent an additional consideration for 
future research. The current results indicate the FPP subscales could benefit from revision. The 
creation of additional items may assist with better capturing the subscale content, and thus 
improve alpha coefficients. Theory-driven item creation and the pilot testing of items would 
likely increase subscale homogeneity. As detailed by Rosas and Camphausen (2007), methods 
such as concept mapping (i.e., specifying conceptual frameworks) can assist with the clear 
conceptual grounding of scale development. Additionally, reorganizing Treatment Needs into 2-
3 discrete subscales may increase scale homogeneity and improve interpretations.  
Be design, Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another (FDIOA), formerly known as 
Factitious Disorder by Proxy, is not addressed in the current study. Future research may wish to 
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develop a different version of the I-SIP for FDIOA cases, with a separate collateral version given 
to the person presented as impaired, injured, or ill (i.e., the victim). A collateral version would 
allow for unique perspectives of perceived motivations and could possibly assist with informing 
treatment (e.g., consequences of factitious behavior, primary motivations, etc). Because many of 
the I-SIP items are directly involving one’s personal internal motivations for feigning, an FDIOA 
version would likely require the development of entirely new items. Taken together, future 
avenues for examining factitious psychological presentations could be extremely conducive to 
expanding the literature and contributing a greater appreciation and understanding of FPPs.  
Concluding Thoughts 
This dissertation represents the first systematic effort to investigate an empirical approach 
that discriminates FPP from malingering, with very encouraging practical implications for 
differentiating closely-related feigned response styles. Despite the challenges of operationalizing 
factious motivations, the results provide initial, yet solid support that FPP as a dimensional 
construct is clearly measureable. It is hoped that the clinical applicability of applying FPPs 
dimensionally will continue to be researched.  
The current study also emphasizes how ratio scores might provide a sophisticated 
measure of clinical constructs (see Rogers et al., 2005), particularly with dynamic relationships, 
such as response styles. Considering the proportionality of constructs, rather than a single -point 
cut score, provides an opportunity to examine constructs directly in relationship to each other. In 
the current dissertation, examinees in malingering and factitious conditions responded in 
dramatically different and conceptually relevant ways, which can be further explored with FPPs 
and other response styles. 
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A.1: Demographic Information Questionaire 
Current Date and Time: 
Gender: 
How old are you? 
What is your ethnicity? 
What is your 1st Language? 
Highest grade completed? 
What is your marital status? 
What is your occupation? 
How many times have you been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons?  
 
A.2: Factitious Simulation Scenario 
• Unmet needs: You admire your current psychologist, Dr. Jones, and her therapeutic 
abilities very much. However, you have become frustrated that the clinic only allows 30-minute 
sessions every other week. She is the only psychologist that truly understands you. You feel 
accepted and cared for when you are with her and nothing fulfills you like seeing Dr. Jones and 
being involved at the mental health clinic.  
• Intensive treatment: You recently learned that Dr. Jones provides intensive outpatient 
treatment with 2-3 sessions every week. Though, this is only for clients in need of more care. If 
only you could be seen daily. You decide it is up to you convince her of your urgent needs to be 
a part of this special program.  
• Your goal: You try to help Dr. Jones understand: 
1. Your urgent psychological needs and that she is the only person to truly help you. 
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2. That she is much more than a doctor to you. 
3. That you would do anything, even exaggerate your symptoms, to get the treatment 
you need. This is the only way to show Dr. Jones how much you really need her help. 
But, you need to make it believable or the psychologist will know you are 
exaggerating. 
 
A.3: Malingering Simulation Scenario 
• Your job is in jeopardy: You know that more jobs will be cut. As a highly paid 
professional, your career is on the chopping block. You fear your job will be cut next. You want 
a way out. If you could appear disabled, you could secure your financial future, and avoid being 
fired. You would also no longer have to work. You deserve some rewards at their expense after 
all your work. Plus, you have your private disability insurance that would pay you generously.  
• Your solution: Naturally, you are stressed and upset by your current circumstances, 
but are not really disabled. If you are going to succeed, you have to prove that you are unable to 
function at your profession (i.e., 100% disabled).  
• Your goal: You need to look severely disabled and unable to function at work. But, 
you need to make it believable or the psychologist will know you are cheating. Overplay your 
psychological symptoms so you are able to prove you are unfit to work, but are still able to get 
your disability claim.   
 
A.4: Manipulation Check 
1. What were your instructions throughout the study? 
 ____ Correct  ____ Incorrect 
*Make sure participant states they first answered surveys honestly and then assumed 




2. What do you remember about the scenario you read (FPP)?  
____ Admire psychologist, Dr. Jones  
____ Want intensive outpatient treatment 
____ Need to show Dr. Jones how much you need her help 
 
What do you remember about the scenario you read (Malingering)?  
____ Job is in jeopardy  
____ Appear disabled  
____ Deserve rewards through private disability insurance  
 
3.  What were you supposed to be doing (FPP)? 
____ Exaggerate symptoms to show how much you need treatment 
____ Show Dr. Jones she is the only one who can help you/more than a doctor to you  
____ Trying to beat the tests 
 
What were you supposed to be doing (Malingering)? 
____ Trying to appear disabled/unable to work 
____ Overplay psychological symptoms  
____ Trying to beat the tests 
 
Compliance: Did you follow your instructions for the second half? 
____ Yes  ____ No 
 
4. If yes – How would you describe your effort at following the instructions on a scale from 
1 to 10, where 1 means you did not try at all and 10 means you tried your hardest? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
5. Do you think you were successful at convincing the psychologist that you were in need of 
her help (FPP)/or that you were disabled and unable to work (MAL)? 
 








Intercorrelations of the I-SIP and WAI under Honest Conditions: FACT Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL group (below the 
Diagonal) 
 
 I-SIP FPP I-SIP ASC WAI Total WAI Bond WAI Task WAI Goal 
I-SIP FPP   .23 .18 .09 .17 .23 
I-SIP ASC  -.06  -.24 -.18 -.26 -.22 
WAI Total .08 -.48**  .81** .94*** .94** 
WAI Bond .17 -.25 .80**  .65** .63** 
WAI Task .02 -.37* .88** .58**  .86** 
WAI Goal .04 -.56** .90** .58*** .66**  




Intercorrelations of the I-SIP and WAI under Simulated Conditions: FACT Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL group (below the 
Diagonal) 
 
 I-SIP FPP I-SIP ASC WAI Total WAI Bond WAI Task WAI Goal 
I-SIP FPP   .19 .28 .20 .21 .33* 
I-SIP ASC  .59***  -.35** -.39** -.31* -.28 
WAI Total -.17 -.41**  .87*** .94*** .94*** 
WAI Bond -.13 -.40** .96***  .75*** .72*** 
WAI Task -.22 -.42** .97*** .90***  .82*** 
WAI Goal -.14 -.36* .97*** .88*** .89***  





Intercorrelations of the I-SIP FPP Scale and IOS under Honest Conditions: FACT Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL Group 
(below the Diagonal) 
 





I-SIP FPP  .23 .50** .13 .37* .56** .28 
I-SIP ASC -.06  .05 -.27 .38* -.08 .13 
IOS Total .39* -.30  .63** .66** .88** .70** 
IOS Emotional .30 -.43** .78**  .05 .52** .31 
IOS Attention .38* .15 .63** .23  .39* .44** 
IOS Pos. Stimulation .38* -.32* .93** .65** .48*  .45** 
IOS Social Comparison -.07 -.29 .53** .40* .02 .41**  




Intercorrelations of the I-SIP FPP Scale and IOS under Simulated Conditions: FACT Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL Group 
(below the Diagonal) 
 





I-SIP FPP   .19 -.12 -.13 -.08 -.09 -.11 
I-SIP ASC .59**  -.43** -.52** -.09 -.43** -.48** 
IOS Total .08 -.13  .76*** .72*** .91*** .91*** 
IOS Emotional .04 -.13 .92***  .19 .81*** .65*** 
IOS Attention .07 .05 .76*** .54***  .43** .64*** 
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IOS Pos. Stimulation .12 -.21 .92*** .85*** .52**  .78*** 
IOS Social Comparison .02 -.15 .90*** .82*** .66*** .74***  




Intercorrelations of the I-SIPASC Scale and LSRP under Honest Conditions: FACT Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL Group 
(below the Diagonal) 
 
 I-SIP ASC I-SIP FPP LSRP Total LSRP Primary LSRP Secondary 
I-SIP ASC   .23 .77** .85** .55** 
I-SIP FPP -.06  .40* .35* .39* 
LSRP Total .89** .03  .95** .92** 
LSRP Primary .88** -.08 .97**  .76** 
LSRP Secondary .81*** .23 .94** .84**  




Intercorrelations of the I-SIPASC Scale and LSRP under Simulated Conditions: for FACT Simulation Group (above the Diagonal) 
and MAL Simulation Group (below the Diagonal) 
 
 I-SIP ASC I-SIP FPP LSRP Total LSRP Primary LSRP Secondary 
I-SIP ASC   .19 .71*** .80*** .42** 
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 I-SIP ASC I-SIP FPP LSRP Total LSRP Primary LSRP Secondary 
I-SIP FPP .59**  .07 .11 -.01 
LSRP Total .87*** .44**  .96*** .87*** 
LSRP Primary .88*** .52** .97***  .70*** 
LSRP Secondary .72*** .24 .91*** .78***  




Intercorrelations of the I-SIP FPP subscales and WAI for FACT Simulation Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL Simulation group 
(below the Diagonal) under Honest Conditions 
 










I-SIP ASC WAI Total 
WAI 
Bond WAI Task WAI Goal 
I-SIP FPP   .90*** .88*** .58*** .23 .19 .09 .17 .23 
I-SIP Cost-Benefit .94***  .65** .49** .22 .06 .01 -.01 .12 
I-SIP Rel. with Providers .89*** .79**  .46** .02 .28 .11 .31 .30 
I-SIP Patient Role .55** .51** .46**  .39* .20 .15 .15 .22 
I-SIP ASC  -.06. -.18 -.21 .09  -.24 -.18 -.26 -.22 
WAI Total .08 .08 .19 -.07 -.48**  .81** .94*** .63** 
WAI Bond .17 .17 .26 .18 -.25 .80**  .65** .63** 
WAI Task .02 .04 .11 -.15 -.37** .88** .58**  .86** 
WAI Goal .04 .02 .15 -.14 -.56** .90** .58** .66**  






Intercorrelations of the I-SIP FPP subscales and WAI for FACT Simulation Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL Simulation group 
(below the Diagonal) under Simulated Conditions 
 










I-SIP ASC WAI Total WAI Bond WAI Task WAI Goal 
I-SIP FPP   .74*** .80*** .60*** .19 .28 .20 .21 .33* 
I-SIP Cost-Benefit .91***  .40** .48*** -.01 .09 -.01 .02 .18 
I-SIP Rel. with 
Providers .89*** .76***  .35* .10 .24 .21 .14 .30 
I-SIP Patient Role .87*** .79*** .71***  -.14 .34* .41** .35* .22 
I-SIP ASC  .59*** .52** .36* .58***  -.35** -.39** -.31* -.28 
WAI Total -.17 -.05 .06 -.22 -.41**  .87*** .94*** .94*** 
WAI Bond -.13 -.04 .11 -.19 -.40** .96***  .75*** .72*** 
WAI Task -.22 -.06 .01 -.27 -.42** .97*** .90***  .82*** 
WAI Goal -.14 -.03 .08 -.17 -.36* .97*** .88*** .89***  




Intercorrelations of the I-SIP FPP subscales and IOS for FACT Simulation Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL Simulation Group 
(below the Diagonal) under Honest Conditions 
 
























I-SIP FPP   .90*** .88*** .58*** .23 .50** .13 .37* .56** .28 
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I-SIP Cost-Benefit .94***  .65** .49** .22 .55** .21 .41** .61** .23 
I-SIP Rel. with 
Providers .89*** .79**  .46** .02 .36* .05 .26 .41** .25 
I-SIP Patient Role .55** .51** .46**  39* .32* -.03 .31 .24 .46** 
I-SIP ASC  -.06. -.18 -.21 .09  .05 -.27 .38* -.08 .13 
IOS Total .39* .31 .46** .12 -.30  .63** .66** .88** .70** 
IOS Emotional .30 .30 .40** -.05 -.43** .78**  .05 .52** .31 
IOS Attention .38* .25 .33* .31 .15 .63** .23  .39* .44** 
IOS Pos. Stim. .32* .30 .48** .11 -.32* .93** .65** .48**  .45** 
IOS Social Comp. -.07 -.05 -.03 -.07 -.29 .53** .40* .02 .41**  




Intercorrelations of the I-SIP FPP subscales and IOS for FACT Simulation Group (above the Diagonal) and MAL Simulation Group 
(below the Diagonal) under Simulated Conditions 
 














I-SIP FPP   .74*** .80*** .60*** .19 -.12 -.13 -.08 -.09 -.11 
I-SIP Cost-
Benefit .91***  .40** .48*** -.01 -.13 -.30 .01 -.10 -.08 
I-SIP Rel. with 
Providers .89*** .76***  .35* .10 .02 .09 .01 .01 -.02 
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Role .87*** .79*** .71***  -.14 -.01 -.02 -.13 .12 -.02 
I-SIP ASC  .59*** .52** .36* .58***  -.43** -.52*** -.09 -.43** -.48** 
IOS Total .08 .18 .20 .14 -.13  .76*** .72*** .91*** .91*** 
IOS Emotional .04 .13 .16 .12 -.13 .92***  .19 .81*** .65*** 
IOS Attention .07 .13 .10 .11 .05 .76*** .54***  .43** .64*** 
IOS Pos. Stim. .12 .22 .27 .14 -.21 .92*** .85*** .52**  .78*** 
IOS Social 
Comp. .02 .12 .14 .09 -.15 .90*** .82*** .66*** .74***  
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